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Innovation Diffusion in the Legal
Industry
William D. Henderson*
ABSTRACT
This article is adapted from a series of blog posts originally
found in my recently-started blog entitled Legal Evolution.  The
foundational material set forth in this article (and in those blog
posts) applies to the legal services market insights gained from
disciplines other than law.  This article begins by setting forth the
well-established theory of an “innovation diffusion curve” and
the research that has identified the factors that affect the rate of
adoption of innovations. This article identifies why innovation in
the legal services market is desirable and applies to the legal ser-
vices field insights drawn from this research in other fields.  In
the course of presenting these theories, the article explains why
and how research about things such as the speed of adoption of
hybrid corn seed is directly relevant to lawyers and law firms.  It
also identifies factors that can promote innovation within a law
firm and factors that can inhibit innovation within a law firm,
including the challenges that firms face because factors that pro-
mote the initial stage of innovation may later hamper its wide-
spread implementation. In addition to the discussion of the
applicability of the innovation diffusion curve to the legal ser-
vices market, this article discusses the relevance of work that has
been done outside of law to identify when an innovation is likely
to “cross the chasm” between early adopters and an early major-
ity and the relevance of Gartner’s work about the impact and
stages of “hype.”  This article also explains the crucial role that
communication channels, such as the Legal Evolution blog, can
play in fostering innovation within the legal services market and
explains how the foundational understanding set forth in this ar-
ticle can help promote legal services innovation and can help one
understand the reasons for the successes—and failures—of legal
services innovation.
* Professor and Stephen F. Burns Chair on the Legal Profession, Indiana Univer-
sity Maurer School of Law.
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Although the content of this article originally was published
in the foundational posts of the Legal Evolution blog, publication
of this article means that my presentation of research from other
fields and the conclusions I draw from that research can reach
those who prefer a more traditional method of transmission. I
thank the editors of Penn State’s Dickinson Law Review for rec-
ognizing the importance of these issues and for agreeing to pub-
lish this article which does not fit the traditional heavily-
footnoted law review format.
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I. WHAT IS LEGAL EVOLUTION?
Legal Evolution is two things.  First, it curates successful exam-
ples of innovation within the legal industry, often relying on a sim-
ple narrative format.  This is because examples and stories tend to
be the most effective way to understand and communicate inher-
ently complex material.
Second, Legal Evolution is an experiment in applied research.
Yes, this sounds hopelessly academic, so let me break it down.
A. An Experiment
Legal Evolution is an experiment because I am trying to create
a new medium for distributing serious research.  Although many
law professors blog in addition to publishing articles in academic
journals (I have long been in this group), for the near future and
hopefully beyond, Legal Evolution will be my primary focus as a
law professor at a Research I university.1  When I submit my annual
1. Research I university was a category that the Carnegie Classification of
Institutions of Higher Education previously used to indicate universities in the
United States that engage in extensive research activity. See DAVID J. WEERTS,
STATE GOVERNMENTS AND RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR A RE-
NEWED PARTNERSHIP 26 (2002).
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report to my dean at Maurer School of Law, I’ll be hanging my hat
almost entirely on Legal Evolution.
B. In Applied Research
Legal Evolution focuses on applied research, which tends to
exist in only specific units of a university.  Consider the following
definition from the Lawrence Berkeley Lab at UC Berkeley, a gov-
ernment-financed applied research lab:
Basic (aka fundamental or pure) research is driven by a scientist’s
curiosity or interest in a scientific question.  The main motivation
is to expand man’s knowledge, not to create or invent something.
Applied research is designed to solve practical problems of the
modern world, rather than to acquire knowledge for knowledge’s
sake.  One might say that the goal of the applied scientist is to
improve the human condition.2
Examples of applied research include rural sociology (increasing
agricultural production), industrial/organizational psychology (im-
proving worker productivity), and public health (reducing and
preventing disease).
C. What’s the Practical Problem that Legal Evolution Is
Designed to Solve?
The practical problem that Legal Evolution addresses is lag-
ging legal productivity.  This is a serious problem because it means
that solving legal problems is becoming, in a relative sense, more
expensive over time.  In the individual client market, more citizens
go without access to legal services.  In the corporate market, clients
cope with budget constraints by demanding fee discounts from law
firms, which undercuts the incentive to create better systems and
processes.
Although lagging legal productivity has a large negative impact
on both individual and corporate clients (the two hemispheres of
law practice)3, the negative effects extend to recent law graduates.
As demand for legal services continues to stagnate, the remaining
work goes disproportionately to older lawyers.  This is because their
2. Fred Prochaska, Basic vs. Applied Research (from Lawrence Berkely Na-
tional Laboratory), SAN JOSE STATE UNIV., http://www.sjsu.edu/people/
fred.prochaska/courses/ScWk170/s0/Basic-vs.-Applied-Research.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2017).
3. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 37, 127–28 (rev. ed. 1994) (introducing and ex-
plaining the two hemispheres).
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training and experience makes them more productive, at least for
doing “bespoke” work by the hour.4  Law schools better connected
with innovations that improve legal productivity will produce grad-
uates with brighter employment prospects.  The current challenge
for virtually every lawyer and professor is knowing where to start.
D. Can We Accelerate the Adoption of Productivity-Enhancing
Innovations?
Legal Evolution is grounded in diffusion theory.  One of diffu-
sion theory’s cornerstone principles is that innovations diffuse
faster when potential adopters have clear examples of how the in-
novation is working for others, particularly those in their peer
group.  These types of examples of solutions are important because
their existence enables legal industry stakeholders to make more
significant investments of time and money.  In the legal field in par-
ticular, examples of already existing solutions serve as a necessary
counterweight to lawyers’ natural skepticism.
The mission of Legal Evolution is not to create new solutions,
but to find examples of what is working and share them with read-
ers.  The core hypothesis is whether well-drawn, specific examples
of successful innovations are useful to those in the legal ecosystem
trying to develop and implement solutions to similar technical
problems.
II. WHAT IS THE ROGERS DIFFUSION CURVE?
FIGURE 1
4. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? (2008) (intro-
ducing framework where legal work moves from bespoke to standardized to sys-
tematized to productized to commoditized).
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The purpose of this Section is to introduce readers to the Rog-
ers Diffusion Curve.  The Rogers Diffusion Curve was created by
the eminent sociologist Everett Rogers.  It was first published in his
book Diffusions of Innovations,5 one of the most widely cited works
in all of the social sciences.
A. The Core Insight of the Rogers Diffusion Curve
Rogers’s core insight—one that is absolutely foundational for
readers—is that the diffusion of innovation is a process that occurs
through a social system.  As shown in the figure above, the social
system has five “adopter” segments that fit a normal distribution.
The segments move from left to right over time in order of adop-
tion:  (1) innovators, (2) early adopters, (3) early majority, (4) late
majority, and (5) laggards.
The groups move in this progression because each group has
attributes that make it more (or less) open to change.  Obviously,
innovators are the most open, and laggards are the least.  With the
exception of the innovators, each group adopts an innovation by
observing experiences of the adjacent reference group.  As
favorable observations and testimonials accumulate, adoption
spreads through the entire social system.
B. Innovators and Early Adopters
Within a social system, the relationship between innovators
and early adopters is different from any other adjacent pairing.
This is because innovators tend to be substantially outside the
mainstream.  They are drawn to ideas based on intellectual curiosity
and passion for what is possible.  As such, they have the patience
and stamina for extensive trial and error and experimentation
(think Thomas Edison).
Innovators are a natural affinity with early adopters because
the latter have intellectual curiosity and patience.  Yet unlike inno-
vators, early adopters tend to have significant influence within the
social system.  Their motive is not necessarily to touch off the wide-
spread adoption of an innovation.  Rather, they want a competitive
advantage over their peers or, alternatively, to maintain leadership
status.  In a word, early adopters tend to be ambitious.
5. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSIONS OF INNOVATIONS 281 (5th ed. 2003).
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The special relationship between
innovators and early adopters is
reflected in the Legal Evolution
logo.  These two groups make up
the light gray portion of the bell
FIGURE 2curve.  This is a population more
than one standard deviation from
the mean in terms of willingness to
adopt a new idea or innovation.
When this group (roughly one sixth)
meets with relative success, the rest
of the social system eventually fol-
lows.  (By the way, by virtue of find-
ing and reading this article, there is
a very high probability that you are
either an innovator, an early
adopter, or a very curious member
of the early majority).
C. Does the Rogers Diffusion Curve Apply to Lawyers?
Legal Evolution is directed at a specific social system:  those
entering or working within the legal industry.  This raises a thresh-
old question likely of interest to readers:  Does the Rogers Diffu-
sion Curve apply to lawyers and the broader legal industry?
I am confident that the answer to this question is yes.  Further,
I believe that knowledge of diffusion theory has enormous practical
value to anyone who is seeking to understand and adapt to the sea
change that is now occurring in the legal services market.6
Note that if diffusion theory applies to lawyers, we are con-
fronted with a difficult takeaway:  for roughly five sixths of the legal
market, the adoption of new innovations is more a social process of
imitation than a mental process of analytical reasoning.  This means
that the vast majority of lawyers (or law students or law professors)
won’t change until they see others successfully change first.  Adop-
tion decisions are more than rational, explicitly stated risk calcula-
tions; they are also strongly influenced by the often-unstated desire
to fit in or, alternatively, the fear of being left behind.
D. The Evidence
Part of my confidence in the Rogers theory of diffusion is the
breadth, quality, and volume of Rogers’s supporting data.  Rogers
6. See supra Section I (explaining structure and intent of Legal Evolution).
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published the first edition of his book, Diffusion of Evolution, in
1962 and spent much of the next four decades updating subsequent
editions with ever richer examples drawn from a diverse array of
geographies, time periods, cultures, and fields of study.  His exam-
ples included public health, technology, education, military, mar-
keting, politics, etc.).
Although Diffusion of Innovations is very thorough and per-
suasive, my confidence in diffusion theory is also borne of personal
experience.  For six years, I was part of a team that built and sold
data analytics products and services to lawyers.  This was my time at
Lawyer Metrics (now owned by AccessLex Institute).7  As I grap-
pled with the lengthy sales cycle, I often compared notes with fel-
low legal start-up travelers.  In most cases, our experiences were
eerily similar; and to the extent they were different, the differences
could be explained through diffusion theory.  Yet, most signifi-
cantly, the application of diffusion theory provided powerful gui-
dance on where and how to allocate our limited bandwidth.
I hope readers come to appreciate the power of diffusion the-
ory and its application to law.  Those who fully grasp these lessons
can do both good and well.
III. UNITS OF ANALYSIS AND ADOPTER TYPES
FIGURE 3
The purpose of this section of the article is to explain diffusion
theory well enough so that readers can apply it to the legal context.
Part I of this section covers units of analysis.  Part II presents
composite sketches of the five adopter types.  Before getting to
these new topics, however, let’s briefly review the foundational
points in the prior section.
7. Learn more about Lawyer Metrics at www.lawyermetrix.net, and Ac-
cessLex Institute at www.accesslex.org.
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A. Law is a Social System
The previous section introduced readers to the key insight that
innovation diffuses through a social system.  The social system has
five segments:  (1) innovators (~2.5 percent), (2) early adopters
(~13.5 percent), (3) early majority (~34 percent), (4) late majority
(~34 percent), and (5) laggards (~16 percent).  With the exception
of innovators, the decision to adopt an innovation is based upon the
observed experiences of the adjacent reference group.  Imitation
and copying play a much bigger role than analytical or abstract
reasoning.
This insight raises a foundational question—does diffusion the-
ory apply to the legal profession?  The short answer is yes.8  Law-
yers very much value the security of the pack, albeit we may be
reluctant to acknowledge its influence on our own judgments.
Why?  Because it cuts against our self-identity as a smart person.
We want to believe we are smart enough to identify the right an-
swer ahead of others; yet we don’t want the risk and exposure of
being separate from the crowd.  Hence, a heavy veneer of reason is
layered onto non-adoption decisions that are primarily driven by
social proof.9  All of this noise invariably slows the pace of innova-
tion for the entire profession.
Yet, here is the crucial insight:  in law as in other social sys-
tems, the protestations and resistance vary along a continuum.  If
you want your innovation to be adopted, don’t waste time trying to
convert the early majority, late majority, or laggards.  You have
only one audience that matters—early adopters.
B. Units of Analysis
Part II of this section presents composite descriptions of
adopter types.  Each description is written as if the adopter were a
person, which makes them relatively vivid and easy to understand.
Yet, in the legal industry as in other complex parts of the economy,
innovation often requires the engagement and support of an entire
organization.  Therefore, before getting into adopter types, we need
to cover a technical concept called “unit of analysis” (or, for diffu-
sion research, “unit of adoption”).
8. See infra Section IV.
9. See Robert B. Cialdini, Harnessing the Science of Persuasion, HARV. BUS.
REV., Oct. 2001, at 75–79.
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1. Organizations
People adopt certain kinds of innovations (e.g., telephones,
personal computers, smartphones, etc.), but other valuable innova-
tions often depend upon successful adoption by businesses (e.g.,
health benefits, enterprise software, flex-time) and/or governments
(e.g., seat belt laws, environmental legislation, smoking bans, gay
marriage).
When the unit of analysis is an organization rather than a per-
son, the dynamics surrounding the innovation decision to accept or
reject are much more complex.
To illustrate, imagine the AmLaw 200 grouped along the
adopter continuum.  A handful of firms would be innovators (~3–7)
while others would be laggards (~30–36 firms, or one sixth of the
market).  Yet, the AmLaw 200 social system is dependent upon a
separate social system of corporate clients who also fall into the five
adopter types.  For an innovator law firm to be successful, it has to
find its counterparts among corporate legal departments—i.e., cli-
ents willing to pay for something promising even though it’s new,
novel, and relatively untested.
If left to random chance, this complex dialogue will be a fairly
rare event.  The 2.5 percent innovator law firms need an audience
with the 16 percent innovator-early adopter clients.  Without
awareness of diffusion theory, the mathematical odds are bleak (2.5
percent x 16 percent = 0.4 percent of buyer-supplier relationships).
Once the right pairing occurs, the parties need a dialogue of suffi-
cient depth to plan, build, and execute a successful innovation that
benefits both buyer and supplier.
After that, and only after that, will the innovation be picked up
and copied by the rest of the social system.  This is why the left
portion of the diffusion curve is so crucial toward making every-
thing else go.
2. Organizational Innovation is Harder
It is extraordinarily difficult to be a true innovator organiza-
tion, particularly within the legal industry.  This is true for several
reasons.
• Wrong Analytical Frame. Legal organizations are social sys-
tems made up of people and subunits that track the five
adopter types.  Yet we often lack this awareness of the impor-
tance of adopter types.  As a result, when promoting an inno-
vation, we place excessive faith in reason and data.  After all,
everyone is a highly educated professional.  Our lack of pro-
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gress is then blamed on the lawyer stereotype—risk averse,
conservative, too focused on precedent, bad at math, etc.—
rather than the possibility that we are talking to the wrong
group of lawyers.  If we are pitching reason and data to early
adopter lawyers, things will go better.
• Consensus Decision-Making. Legal service organizations tend
to make organizational change decisions through committees.
That is challenging enough.  But the composition of these
groups are often designed to manage prideful and contentious
lawyers.  Optimizing innovation is not even on the table.
Think I am just talking about law firms?  Not true.  David
Cambria, Director of Global Legal Operations at ADM, and
Jeff Carr, General Counsel of Univar, often use the term
“MPR” (massive passive resistance) to describe the most com-
mon reaction to in-house change efforts.  This is fixable, but it
takes time and planning, as the politics can’t be ignored.
• True Innovators Often Lack a Brand.  I have seen this fact pat-
tern many times.  Innovator sees a better way while working
inside a large industry leader.  The better way is presented to
colleagues who cannot yet grasp the advantage.  Innovator
leaves to form a legal start-up.  Yet, the innovator fails to fully
appreciate the difficulty of making sales (or even getting a
meeting) without the halo of an established legal brand.  In
turn, the sales cycle lasts forever plus three days.  Some inno-
vators have overcome this hurdle (e.g., United Lex, Pangea3,
Axiom Law, Radiant Law), and more will in the future.  But
it’s a brutal road.
There are several more challenges, but that is enough for now.  Suf-
fice it to say, it takes tremendous knowledge, skill, persistence, and
leadership to create an innovative legal organization.  What Legal
Evolution (and this article) seeks to do is create a reliable roadmap
for legal services innovators—that is the purpose of all this empiri-
cally grounded theory.
3. The Consumer Market is Different
The market for legal services has two major segments:  individ-
ual clients (people) and organizational clients (mostly corpora-
tions).10  In the smaller People Law segment (roughly one fourth of
the U.S. legal market), the unit of adoption is a person with a legal
problem.  If the person can understand the innovation and the rela-
10. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 3, at 37, 127–28. See also Bill Hen-
derson, Lawyers for People Versus Lawyers for Business, LEGAL WHITEBOARD
(Sept. 14, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2016/09/-law-
yers-for-people-versus-lawyers-for-business.html.
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tive benefits are fairly large, the innovation will take hold.  Adver-
tising and marketing can often speed this process up.  This is the
market space occupied by LegalZoom, Avvo, and Wevorce.  The
diffusion analysis is relatively straightforward and conventional.
However, organizational clients account for three fourths of
the legal services market.  Further, the organizational market is not
merely buyers and sellers—it also includes a complex supply chain
that now includes managed service providers, legal tech companies
with workflow and automation offerings, and various sourcing con-
sultants.  For now, however, it is enough to say that innovation
roadblocks are more formidable when all the buyers and sellers are
groups of lawyers accustomed to consensus decision-making, than
when the decision-maker is an individual client.
C. Adopter Types
The descriptions below draw extensively from Diffusion of In-
novations.11  I hope you ask yourself the question, “[w]ithin the le-
gal social system, which adopter type am I?”
Innovators place a high value on venturesomeness.  Their in-
terest in new ideas leads them out of conventional peer networks
into more far-flung social and professional circles.  “Communica-
tion patterns and friendships among a clique of innovators are com-
mon, even though the geographical distance between the
innovators may be considerable.”  This is certainly true in law.  The
early days of Legal On Ramp (LOR)12 revealed the broad geo-
graphic dispersion of legal innovators and their desire to communi-
cate with each other.  The LOR chat boards circa 2007–2009 were
routinely populated with lawyers from three or more continents.
One of the reasons for the far-flung connections is to better
accumulate and understand complex technical information that can
be applied to difficult problems.  Rogers notes that the “innovator
must be able to cope with the high degree of uncertainty about an
innovation at the time that the innovator adopts” and also be com-
fortable with occasional failures and setbacks.  Although innovators
are generally viewed with skepticism by mainstream peers, they
play “a gatekeeping role in the flow of new ideas into a system.”13
Early adopters are much more integrated into the social system
than innovators.  They are often the opinion leaders and thus are
11. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 280–290.
12. For a description of Legal On Ramp, see its Wikipedia entry at https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_OnRamp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
13. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 282–83.
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influential in getting others to act.  As compared to the early and
late majorities and the laggards, early adopters tend to be more in-
tellectually curious, favorably disposed to science and data, com-
fortable with abstraction and uncertainty, and more socially and
professionally ambitious.
The early adopter is also aware of his or her favored standing
among peers and knows “that to continue to earn this esteem of
colleagues and to maintain a central position in the communication
structure of the system, he or she must make judicious innovation-
decisions.”14  Rogers notes, “[t]he early adopter decreases uncer-
tainty about a new idea by adopting it, and then conveying a subjec-
tive evaluation of the innovation to near peers through
interpersonal networks.  In one sense, early adopters put their
stamp of approval on a new idea by adopting it.”15  In the logo of
Legal Evolution, innovators and early adopters are both repre-
sented by the same light gray color.  This is because their relation-
ship to each other is fundamentally different than the relationships
between other adopters.16
The early majority adopts innovations faster than the average
member of the social system.  Although they interact frequently
with their peers, the early majority “seldom hold positions of opin-
ion leadership in a system.”  Yet, because of their position in the
adoption process, they are the group that sets off the tipping point
for eventual mass adoption.  Rogers quotes Alexander Pope to de-
scribe this group:  “Be not the first by which the new is tried, nor
the last to lay the old aside.”17
The journalist Geoffrey Moore has characterized the transition
between early adopters and early majority as “crossing the
chasm.”18  Moore’s context is primarily Silicon Valley high-tech
companies selling enterprise software and similar complex products
to corporations.  Moore’s analysis is quite relevant to law.  I will
discuss more on that topic  later.
The late majority is skeptical and cautious.  They generally will
not adopt an innovation until “most others in the system have done
so.”19  By this time, the decision is likely to be either a matter of
14. Id. at 283.
15. Id.
16. See supra Section II.
17. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 284 (quoting ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON
CRITICISM (1711)).
18. See GEOFFREY MOORE, CROSSING THE CHASM 20–23 (1st ed. 1991).
19. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 284.
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economic necessity or necessary in order to avoid the discomfort of
being outside the norms of the social system.
Rogers notes that socio-economic status tends to be correlated
with adopter type.  Thus, the late majority may have fewer re-
sources to take risks and thus may prefer to wait and learn from the
experience of others.  Yet, the late majority’s risk averse mindset
might be less an effect of fewer financial resources than its cause.
Rogers characterizes this group as followers because the “pressure
of peers” is usually a necessary ingredient to get them to adopt.20
Laggards are traditionalists who tend to make sense of the
world by reference to the past.  Among the five adopter types, they
have the fewest connections to others.  Many laggards are “near
isolates in the social networks of their system” and “interact prima-
rily with others who also have relatively traditional values.”  Yet,
their slow adoption is not merely a function of limited connectivity.
Laggards “tend to be suspicious of innovations and of change
agents.”  Thus, once made aware of a new idea or methodology,
their time period for adoption is significantly longer than others.21
Rogers acknowledges that late adoption may be rational for
those in a social system who can least afford to bear the cost of
failure.  Likewise, laggard “might sound like a bad name” though
no disrespect is intended by diffusion researchers.22  Rogers ob-
serves that a negative connotation would attach to any label associ-
ated with the last group to adopt.  This is because the rest of the
social system tends to view innovation more favorably.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 284–85.
22. Id. at 285.
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IV. VARIABLES DETERMINING THE RATE OF ADOPTION OF
INNOVATIONS
FIGURE 4. ROGERS RATE OF ADOPTION MODEL
This section examines the practical value of applied research.
What is the specific practical value of diffusion theory?
• If you are an innovator, this model can be used as a functional
checklist to assess whether your innovation is ready for mar-
ket; and if so, where to focus your limited bandwidth to maxi-
mize the odds of successful adoption.
• If you are an early adopter, this model helps you assess
whether you want to cast your lot with a specific innovation or,
instead, hold your powder until the innovation is more devel-
oped or another innovator produces something better.
The graphic above is adapted from Chapter Six of Diffusion of
Innovations.23  As noted earlier, this is one of the most cited books
in all of the social sciences.  Although the graphic does not look
quantitative, it is actually a user-friendly presentation of a mul-
tivariate regression model.
The left column of the graphic lists five groups of variables that
influence the rate of adoption of an innovation.  The rate of adop-
tion is the dependent variable, which is listed in the right column.
23. See id. at 222 fig.6-1.
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The rate of adoption is a dependent variable because its value de-
pends on the value of the other variables.  In the parlance of statis-
tics, the other variables are called “independent” or “predictor”
variables.  The five groups of variables on the left have been shown
by Rogers and others researchers to be valid and reliable predictors
of the rate of adoption of an innovation.
If you’re investing a lot of time and money in an innovation,
this is a profoundly useful model.
A. Perceived Attributes of an Innovation
Among the five categories of predictor variables, the most im-
portant is the first category, which is the “perceived attributes of
innovation.”  Rogers reports that between “49 and 87 percent” of
the variance in the rate of adoption can be explained by five attrib-
utes:  (1) relative advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) complexity, (4)
trialability, and (5) observability.24
Note that this is a list of perceived attributes.  Perceived by
whom?  The target adopter.
There are many ways to fail as an innovator, but one of the
most common is failing to adopt the perspective of the end user.
Rogers begins Chapter Six with a telling quote:  “If men perceive
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”25  Adopting
the perspective of the end user is an exercise in empathy.  This can
be very difficult for the innovator, who is often deeply immersed in
the technical workings of the project.  He or she is at grave risk of
falling in love with features that are of little practical value to the
target end user.26
Rogers distinguishes between “objective rationality” relied
upon by the expert who carefully reviews data and “subjective ob-
jectivity as perceived by the individual”—in other words, the likely
end user.27  The latter is what is relevant to adoption.  Most of us
try to generalize based on what makes sense to us.  Instead, we
need to spend all of our time studying someone very different and
seeing the world through their eyes.  Acquiring this skill set takes
effort, self-awareness and humility.  What you think or I think as an
Innovator does not matter—what matters is the end user.
24. Id. at 221.
25. Id. at 219 (quoting W.I. THOMAS FLORIAN ZNANIECKI, THE POLISH PEAS-
ANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 81 (1927)).
26. This tendency is sometimes called the curse of knowledge.  See generally,
Jane Kennedy, Debiasing the Curse of Knowledge in Audit Judgment, 70 ACCT.
REV. 249, 273 (1995) (investigating this cognitive bias that afflicts experts).
27. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 232.
2018] INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY 413
Here is a summary of each perceived attribute.
1. Relative Advantage
Relative advantage is “the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes.”28  The ad-
vantage could take the form of economic benefit, an increase in
social status, or both.
It is worth reinforcing the user perspective here.  I have seen
numerous legal start-ups struggle and fail because the founders
were pitching efficiency to law firms.  Although clients complain
about high legal bills, a law firm that makes a large capital invest-
ment in efficiency has a very difficult time capturing a reasonable
portion of the value created.29  When a salesperson makes the effi-
ciency pitch, they are generalizing from their world, not the world
of the prospective law firm adopter.  Quality, on the other hand,
has a much stronger appeal to lawyers, primarily because it is asso-
ciated with lower risk.  We’ll go deeper on this issue at a later point.
See, for example, the discussion below regarding trialability and
Practical Law Company’s successful entry into the U.S. legal
market.
2. Compatibility
Compatability is “the degree to which an innovation is per-
ceived as consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and
needs of potential adopters.”30  The phrase “disruptive innovation”
undoubtedly helped Clayton Christensen sell hundreds of
thousands of copies of his famous book, The Innovator’s Di-
lemma.31  However, it is not a phrase that will endear you to the
vast majority of adopters who have zero interest in having their
livelihoods disrupted.  The touchstone here is familiarity.  The
closer we hew to what is known and accepted, the lower the levels
of perceived uncertainty.  That is a zone where your innovation has
a chance of getting adopted.
To illustrate this point, Rogers notes that care should be taken
in naming an innovation, as the name often carries influential con-
28. Id. at 229.
29. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, The Legal Profession’s “Last Mile Prob-
lem,” LAW.COM, May 26, 2017 (discussing coordination problem of supplier having
capability to innovate to benefit buyer but innovation failing to occur because sup-
plier cannot be certain it can recoup its investment).
30. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 240.
31. CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
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notations that can undermine relative advantage.32  Note that com-
patibility is often treated as an empirical question.  “Positioning”
research looks for optimal associations with accepted products or
services in the adopters’ environment.  Likewise, “acceptability” re-
search seeks to identify factors that tend to make or break an adop-
tion decision.  Compatibility research is quantifying the emotional,
subjective reactions of potential users.  The closest comparison to
this in law is focus groups designed to simulate juror reactions.  The
best trial lawyers use this methodology in preparation for trial.33
3. Complexity
Complexity is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived
as relatively difficult to understand and use.”34  Whereas relative
advantage and compatibility exert a positive influence on adoption,
complexity has a negative effect.  The higher the perceived com-
plexity, the lower the rate of adoption.  Thus, it is not surprising
that successful tech companies obsess over user experience (UX)
and user interface (UI).  Design thinking often adds value by re-
moving unnecessary and cumbersome complexity.35  The graphic
below illustrates this point.  The product on the left was designed
for the end user; the product on the right stayed too much within
the perspective of the engineer.
32. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 250–51.
33. For example, the great trial lawyer, Fred Bartlit, once told the author he
used eight separate mock juries for a case he was trying.  No surprise—he won.
See William D. Henderson, Is a Great Lawyer Born or Made?, NAT’L JURIST, Jan.
2012, at 6–7.
34. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 257.
35. See, e.g., Jon Kolko, Design Thinking Comes of Age, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept. 2015, at 66–71.
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FIGURE 5
The iOS Human Interface Guidelines are available online.36
4. Trialability
Trialability is “the degree to which an innovation may be ex-
perimented with on a limited basis.”  Rogers continues, “[n]ew
ideas that can be tried on the installment plan are generally
adopted more rapidly than innovations that are not divisible.”37
Several years ago, the original U.S. sales team of Practical Law
Company (PLC) shared with me how they successfully established
their U.S. operations.  PLC sells annotated forms and practice
guides for sophisticated corporate work.  Although PLC dominated
the British market, they had no American customers when they be-
gan doing business in New York in 2007.  Through trial and error,
they soon discovered that the single best way to overcome the skep-
ticism of American lawyers was to put them in front of a computer
and let them use the PLC product.  After experiencing the prod-
uct’s immense utility, subscriptions were relatively easy to close.  By
the time PLC was sold to Thomas Reuters in 2013 (for a price be-
tween $300–450 million),38 PLC had 700 legal departments and 86
percent of the AmLaw 200 as customers.39
Trialability was certainly relevant to PLC’s rate of adoption.
However, the PLC product line also had a huge relative advantage
36. See iOS Design Themes, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/ios/human-
interface-guidelines/overview/themes/.
37. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 258.
38. See Ben Harrington, Thomson Reuters Buys Practical Law Company,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/9779041/Thomson-Reuters-buys-Practical-
Law-Company.html.
39. See Press Release, Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters to Acquire Prac-
tical Law Company (Jan. 3, 2013), online at https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en/
press-releases/2013/thomson-reuters-to-acquire-practical-law-company.html.
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over the incomplete, out-of-date, and unannotated internal forms
they were replacing.  Trialability enabled perspective adopters to
experience the quality difference.  To enable high quality decision-
making, it is important to keep analytically distinct each of the five
perceived attributes of an innovation.  Trialability is different than
overall relative advantage, though both levers are important.
5. Observability
Observability is “the degree to which the results of an innova-
tion are visible to others.”40  Observability is very much related to
relative advantage and trialabilty.  If an innovation is trialable for
early adopters, its relative advantage can be more easily observed
by other parts of the social system.
The importance of observability is documented in an early and
influential diffusion study that focused on adoption of hybrid seed
corn in two communities in Iowa.41  What drove adoption for the
vast majority of farmers was not the technical sales pitch made by
college-educated agronomists.  Rather, it was the observably better
corn growing on their neighbor’s land.  The technical pitch was pri-
marily relevant to the innovators and early adopters in the social
system who set the adoption cycle in motion.  The average time be-
tween “knowledge awareness” and the “adoption decision” (techni-
cal terms of art in diffusion research) was a fairly lengthy six years.
See Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
40. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 258.
41. See generally Bryce Ryan & Neal C. Gross, The Diffusion of Hybrid Seed
Corn in Two Iowa Communities, 8 RURAL SOC. 15 (1943).
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I believe the above chart is very relevant to all the hype regard-
ing how artificial intelligence (“AI”) is going to revolutionize the
legal field.  AI does not have a relative advantage that is easy to
observe.  Mere efficiency (an obvious and potentially observable
advantage) is not good enough for many lawyer-adopters, as effi-
ciency currently creates collateral business problems that most cli-
ents fail to acknowledge.42  AI is also very complex.  These
perceived attributes are going to impede AI’s rate of adoption in
law.  Many smart people in legal start-ups are trying to use design
principles to solve or mitigate these issues.  Yet, the best of them
know they are climbing a very steep mountain.
6. Summary of Perceived Attributes
As noted earlier, the five factors above explain 50 percent or
more of the variance in adoption rates.  Stated another way, if you
have an innovation you would like others to adopt, focus your at-
tention on these five factors.  This simple, empirically-derived piece
of guidance is one of the reasons that applied research can be so
powerful.
Four other categories of variables influence the rate of innova-
tion adoption (II to V in Figure 4, supra).  Most of these variables
cannot be significantly influenced by the efforts of innovators,
though they are highly relevant because they enable an innovator
or early adopter to handicap or evaluate the odds of market accept-
ance.  In other words, they bear on practical questions like, “should
I put more money in?”; “should I sell now?”; “should I fold the
business?”; “how long is adoption likely to take compared to other
business contexts?”  Thus, let’s finish the model with a eye toward
how it applies to the legal industry.
B. Types of Innovation Decision
At some point after a potential adopter becomes aware of an
innovation and weighs its relative advantages, a decision will be
made to accept or reject the innovation.  There are three types of
innovation decisions.
1. Optional.  Basically everyone in the social system is free to
decide for themselves.  This is market-based.  Examples in-
clude smartphones, healthier foods, and Facebook.
2. Collective.  Through agreement or strong cultural norms,
adoption requires a consensus of the entire group.  This
42. See, e.g., Henderson, Last Mile Problem, supra note 29 (discussing last
mile problem).
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mechanism has the most negative impact on rate of adoption.
It is also the mechanism that best describes the typical law
firm partnership.
3. Authority.  One decision-maker makes the decision for the
entire social system such as a corporate executive or govern-
ment official.  Although authority innovation-decisions are
generally the fastest, they run the risk of being “circum-
vented by members of a system during their
implementation.”43
The type of innovation decision involved is very relevant to the le-
gal industry.  Back in 2015, I organized a panel of legal innovators
for the ABA Center on Professional Responsibility.  One of the
panelists was a venture capitalist (“VC”) who was an investor in
Modria, an online dispute resolution service that uses an automated
dispute resolution methodology similar to those used by eBay and
PayPal.  As a former associate at a prominent Silicon Valley law
firm, the VC helped pioneer some of the early investment in legal
tech, albeit not all investments worked out well.  In front of an au-
dience of 300 law firm lawyers, the VC stated that he would never
again invest in a technology that was designed to be sold to law
firms because “law firms don’t make decisions like rational
businesses.”
Placed into the Rogers decision framework, the VC was frus-
trated by the collective decision-making process of law firm part-
nerships.  From far away, it looks irrational.  Up close, however, it’s
justified as culture.
That said, it is very easy to confuse the long sales cycle in law
with the more fundamental issue of relative advantage.  For exam-
ple, many partners hear their clients clamoring for greater effi-
ciency, and hence are willing to listen to sales pitches.  Yet, the
partners don’t know how to honor the clients’ wish because it re-
quires them to simultaneously (a) pay for, and learn how to use,
expensive, complex innovations, and (b) endure a loss in revenues
because the clients insist on using hourly production to measure
value.  Insistence on hourly billing, or shadow billing of alternative
fee argeements or AFAs, is a great example of a compatibility re-
straint that impedes innovation.  The legal profession has a very se-
rious “last mile” problem.44  However, unlike the last mile in the
telecom industry, which centered on the technology necessary to
bring high-speed data from the street lines into the home, the legal
43. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 29.
44. See Henderson, Last Mile Problem, supra note 29 (discussing last mile
problem).
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industry’s last mile is the high switching costs and lack of business
models designed to implement labor-saving innovations.
I am confident that the rise of the legal operations role within
legal departments is substantially due to the advantages that come
from using the authority model of innovation-decision making.  The
authority model has a single general counsel who possesses tradi-
tional executive perogatives.  That authority is increasingly being
delegated to legal operations professionals who have a clear direc-
tive to obtain better, faster, and less expensive results.45
Yet, in the best of circumstances, change of process in legal
departments is no cakewalk.  Jeff Carr, formerly General Counsel
of FMC and now at Univar, acknowledged the challenge of “mas-
sive passive resistance” (MPR) in implementing necessary change.
Having achieved remarkable financial results through his ACES
model,46 Jeff became a fierce proponent of general counsel as
leader, a discipline and topic completely foreign to most lawyers.
If you ask Jeff about the key to successful implementation of
change—requiring every in-house lawyer in his department to regu-
larly score outside counsel using a standard grading rubric—he is
likely to point to his face:  “See this look.  This is the look of me not
caring [if you object].  These metrics are necessary for the function-
ing of the company.  Please do your job.”47  Another prominent
general counsel who successfully transitioned a large legal depart-
ment away from the billable hour, and has served as an influential
advisor to many general counsel, acknowledged to me that such a
transition could easily entail the resignation or dismissal of roughly
30 percent of the department—that was the volume of turnover in
his department and other successful legal department transitions he
has observed.  Change is hard, even for highly educated
professionals.
Suffice it to say, whether it’s collective innovation-decisions, or
the reluctance of lawyer-leaders to stay the course because we have
little training or experience as managers or leaders, the legal indus-
45. See Bill Henderson, Six Types of Law Firm Clients (005), LEGAL EVOLU-
TION (May 9, 2017), https://www.legalevolution.org/2017/05/six-types-of-law-firm-
clients-005/ (discussing CLOC and the rise of the Type 6 client).
46. For a description of the ACES model, see ACC Value Challenge Tool Kit
Resource, Alternative Billing by Paying for Performance: Focus on FMC Technolo-
gies’ ACES (Alliance Counsel Engagement System) Program, ASS’N CORP. COUNS.
(Sept. 2008), http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/upload/Value-
Practice-FMC-Alternative-Billing.pdf.
47. This quote is based on several conversations between the author and Jeff
Carr.
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try presents special challenges for innovation adoption and
diffusion.
C. Communication Channels
The rate of innovation is positively influenced by the number
and quality of communication channels.  This is true in two ways.
First, early adopters may become aware of an innovation through a
new communication channel (e.g., the trade press or an industry
conference).  Second, more and better communication channels
make innovations more observable to the rest of the social system.
Not only does this facilitate economically driven adoption decisions
based on relative advantage, it also works to set and reinforce
group norms.  Thus, a subset of adoption decisions will be socially
driven by a desire to fit in or avoid feeling left behind or out of
date.  Again, diffusion of innovations is a social process; incentives
are present, but they are often more social than economic.
Not surprisingly, the proliferation of multiple communication
channels like print journalism, radio, television, and the Internet
have all increased the pace of innovation adoption.  The rise of
mass media is one of the most important areas of study in diffusion
research.  Following the publication of the first edition of Diffusion
of Innovations in 1962, Rogers, who was a sociologist by training,
joined the faculty of the Department of Communications at Michi-
gan State University.  At the time, MSU was the leading institution
in this fledgling academic discipline.48
Communication channels are important to innovation because
they increase the flow of information.  Yet, factors that influence
total flow are different from the factors that influence the persua-
siveness of the information content.  For the latter, relative advan-
tage, compatibility, complexity, trailabilty, and observability remain
the touchstones.
One of the reaons why I started the Legal Evolution blog was
to provide a new communication channel in order to help acceler-
ate the pace of legal industry innovation.  As noted in Section 1, the
Legal Evolution blog (and this article) are experiments in applied
research.49
48. See generally, Everett M. Rogers, The Department of Communication at
Michigan State University as a Seed Institution for Communication Study, 52
COMM. STUD. 234 (2001).
49. See supra Section I.
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D. Nature of the Social System
In Rogers’s model, the nature of the social system is the fourth
category of variables that can impact the rate of adoption of an
innovation.
For the legal industry, the nature of the social system generally
impedes innovation adoption.  The most established, influential,
and prestigious portions of the legal profession—large law firms,
the federal judiciary, legal academia, and the ABA—tend to be tra-
dition bound and skeptical of change that does not initiate with
them.
Part of this conservative ethos may be the product of Rule
5.4,50 which has been adopted in some form by every state.  Rule
5.4 prohibits lawyers from co-venturing with other professionals in
any business that involves the practice of law.  If lawyers can’t be
business partners with accountants, engineers, software developers,
process experts, and data scientists, etc., there will be fewer oppor-
tunities to learn from them.  This makes our social system much
more isolated from other innovative parts of modern information
economy.
E. Efforts of Change Agents
The fifth variable in Figure 4 is the change agent.  Chapter
Nine of Diffusion of Innovations is focused on the change agent.  It
begins with the following quote:
One of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new
idea.  It . . . makes you think that after all, your favorite notions
may be wrong, your firmest beliefs ill-founded. . . . Naturally,
therefore, common men hate a new idea, and are disposed more
or less to ill-treat the original man who brings it.51
This is harsh but also has a ring of truth to it.  To avoid a hostile
reception, effective change agents seek out individuals more dis-
posed toward their message, a group disproportionately comprised
of innovators and early adopters.  After the change agent assists
this group in obtaining a large advantage that others can observe,
the change agent will become more accepted within the broader
social system, but probably not until then.
50. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (titled,
Professional Independence of a Lawyer) [hereafter MODEL RULE 5.4].
51. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 365 (quoting WALTER BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND
POLITICS 169 (1873)).
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Change agents can be university field specialists trying to dis-
seminate agricultural best practices for the good of the state econ-
omy.  They might also be public health professionals seeking to
curb a longstanding but harmful cultural practice that is increasing
the spread of disease.  The biggest challenge facing change agents
tends to be “heterophily”—i.e., they are often conspicuously differ-
ent than members of the social system in terms of background and
technical expertise.  Hence, they struggle to communicate effec-
tively with prospective adopters.  Successful change agents find
ways to overcome this hurdle.  Rogers writes, “[a]s a bridge be-
tween two differing systems, the change agent is a marginal figure
with one foot in each of two worlds.”52
In the legal industry, change agents are most likely to take the
form of technical sales people who are trying to get onto your cal-
endar to sell you a new technology or service.  At industry events,
these folks are typically called “vendors.”  The connotation associ-
ated with vendors is often negative.  In my opinion, this is a paro-
chial way of viewing the world that cannot be squared with our
poor record on client service, innovation, and access to justice.  In
light of these issues, perhaps we should be more gracious and open-
minded to those offering tools for improvement.
That said, change agents also exist in established law firms and
legal departments—they are quixotic lawyers and other profession-
als convinced there has to be a better way.  In turn, they forge
ahead without an empirically grounded theory to guide their ac-
tions.  As a result, their courage and good intentions are too often
wasted.
As editor of Legal Evolution, I’ll acknowledge my own desire
to serve as a change agent.  After 15 years of study, it is clear to me
that traditional methods of legal problem-solving are underserving
clients and the broader society.  This systemic breakdown can only
be shored up through innovations that improve legal productivity—
combining lawyerly judgment with better people systems, process,
data, and technology.  Higher productivity will enable more legal
output to be afforded by more people and businesses.  I realize this
entails a value judgment on my part—I generally favor the innova-
tors.  But it is also a judgment informed by a lot of data and field
research.  I am also motivated by the longterm welfare of my stu-
dents at Indiana Law.  I need to be part of a system that works for
them and their clients.
52. Id. at 368.
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My change agent role at Legal Evolution has a very simple
formula.  After explaining the basics of diffusion theory in founda-
tional posts I present finely drawn examples of innovations that ap-
pear to be working in the field.  In each case, I provide as much
context as possible, as the goal is to enable the success of legal inno-
vators and early adopters.
V. FAST VERSUS SLOW INNOVATIONS
Are rapidly adopted innovations more valuable and important
than innovations that take a long time to take hold?  Not necessa-
rily.  Speed of adoption is not a reliable guide for an innovation’s
importance.  In fact, competitive advantage is much more likely to
lie among slower ideas where innovators focus on several key fac-
tors to accelerate the rate of adoption.
It is difficult to accept an insight this counterintuitive.  Thus,
we need an illustration.53
A. A Life and Death Illustration
Consider the following real world example of two important
innovations, both in the field of medical surgery.
The first innovation is the use of ether as a surgical anesthetic.
With patients unconscious and insensitive to pain, doctors were
able to complete their work without patients screaming in agony.
Reports of initial trials were first published in the Boston Medical
and Surgical Journal (now The New England Journal of Medicine)
in 1846.  Within a half year, similar experimentations rapidly spread
throughout the United States and Europe.  Within seven years,
ether-based anesthesia had become standard operating procedure
in hospitals throughout the world.  By any standard, this innovation
spread very rapidly.
The second innovation is the use of antiseptic procedures to
eliminate microorganisms from the operating room.  During the
19th century, post-surgical infections were the biggest source of
mortality for major operations, claiming up to half of all patients.
In 1867, the British surgeon Joseph Lister published his theory of
antisepsis and promising clinical results in a series of reports in The
Lancet.
Since Lister’s innovation curbed patient death—likely the most
important objective in the medical field—one would think that anti-
septic procedures would have spread as quickly as ether.  Yet, that
53. These vignettes are drawn from Atul Gawande, Slow Ideas, NEW YORKER
(July 29, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/29/slow-ideas.
424 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:395
is not what happened.  In contrast to ether, antiseptic procedures
were relatively difficult to try out:  hands needed to be washed, sur-
gical instruments needed to be sterilized, surgical sponges couldn’t
be reused, and gowns and gloves had to be changed after each pro-
cedure.  Thus, despite the incredibly high stakes for patients, it took
a full generation before Lister’s recommendations took hold.
The above vignettes illustrate that speed of adoption is not sy-
nonymous with what is socially and economically valuable.  In fact,
these are distinct constructs.  We confuse the two because innova-
tions that diffuse faster are generally easier to try out and under-
stand.  Thus, with a small investment, the end user can experience
their value.  Not surprisingly, we favor fast ideas.
B. Empirically Grounded Principles
The difference between speed of adoption and an innovation’s
benefits can be seen in the prediction model summarized in Figure
4 above.  Recall that for most innovations, between “49 and 87 per-
cent” of the variance in rate of adoption is explained by just five
factors related to the perceived attribute of innovation:  (1) relative
advantage, (2) compatibility, (3) complexity, (4) trialability, and (5)
observability.54
In Rogers’s model, rate of adoption is the attribute we want to
influence (the “dependent” variable).  The social and economic
value of the innovation is the “relative advantage” factor that influ-
ences the rate of adoption (an “independent”, or predictor, varia-
ble).  Note that relative advantage is but one factor that influences
the rate of adoption.  The innovator/early adopter/change agent
who fails to understand this is flying blind and faces enormous risk
of failure.55
C. Application
To illustrate the power of the first five factors of the model
related to perceived attributes, let’s apply them to the case of ether
and antisepsis.  For ease of calculation, each factor is measured
along a seven-point scale that runs -3 to +3.  The following interpre-
tative rules apply:
• Positive numbers (+1 to +3) speed up the adoption rate
• Negative numbers (-1 to -3) slow it down
54. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 221.
55. See supra Section III (describing adopter types); supra Section IV (dis-
cussing sources of adoption failure).
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• Mild effect = -1 or 1; moderately strong = -2 or 2; very strong =
-3 or 3
• No effect on rate of adoption = 0
We then total the scores for all the variables.  Innovations with
a total score > 0 will tend to diffuse faster, in a relative sense, than
innovations with a total score < 0.56
The table below summarizes the scores for ether and antisep-
sis.  The relative advantage is divided into two scales to reflect the
differences in benefits flowing to doctors versus patients.
TABLE 1
In Table 1 above, the factors with the largest numerical gaps are the
factors that are exerting the largest impact on diffusion rates.  Why
did ether diffuse so much faster than antisepsis?  With the benefit
of an empirically grounded model, we can boil down the differences
to three key factors.
• Relative advantage (for doctors):  6 points (+3 to -3)
• Observability:  6 points (+3 to -3)
56. Readers trying to apply this model are encouraged to use simple scales, at
least initially.  Although simple scales like the -3 to +3 entail some subjectivity and
do not capture quantum effects (for example, impact of 1–2 may be less, or more,
than the impact of 2–3, etc.), the results can be very useful, particularly when mak-
ing simple comparisons.
426 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:395
• Trialability:  4 points (+1 to -3)
In narrative form, antisepsis was slow to diffuse because it re-
quired an enormous imposition on doctors, both to try out and to
implement.  Further, its benefits could only be observed through
data generated weeks or months later.  As a result of this adoption
failure, hundred of thousands if not millions of people died of post-
operative infections.
D. Slow but Valuable Innovations
Within the legal industry, there are many valuable innovations
that have a very high relative advantage but will tend to diffuse
slowly.  Using Rogers’s model, we can isolate the reasons:  the inno-
vations are:  (a) culturally incompatible with lawyer norms and
practices; (b) technically complex in areas outside lawyers’ core
technical training; (c) difficult to pilot; and/or (d) difficult to ob-
serve, often only through data that must be calculated over time.
Examples of slow but valuable innovations include:
• Project management and process improvement, including in-
tegration of AI into workflows
• Alternative Fee Agreements (AFAs) that reward efficiency
and innovation
• Enterprise-level workflow management
• Talent management based on behavioral science
• Construction of client-facing self-help solutions
Despite being slow innovations, their relative advantage is
steadily increasing over time because more and more legal clients
cannot afford legal services that rely upon artisan methods of
production.57
In the legal profession, we tend toward fatalism when it comes
to change management.  Is it possible that this fatalism is the prod-
uct of pervasive underinvestment in planning and implementation?
One fast innovation we have all lived through is the diffusion of the
smartphone.  It diffused so quickly because Apple engineers took a
decade to eliminate any feature that would detract from the end
57. See Bill Henderson, Fast Versus Slow Innovations (011), LEGAL EVOLU-
TION (June 21, 2017), https://www.legalevolution.org/2017/06/fast-versus-slow-inno-
vations-011/ (discussing connection between historically low levels of law school
graduates and 75 percent of cases in state courts with an unrepresented plaintiff or
defendant).
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user experience.58  The development costs, both financial and
human, were enormous.  Yet, by making these investments, Apple
obtained staggering returns on the backend.
The key point of this section has been that the rate of adoption
is an attribute than can be altered through planning and effort.  I
would encourage readers to reflect on slow but valuable innova-
tions.  Thanks to years of research, this is no longer an unstructured
exercise.  We increase rate of adoption by increasing cultural com-
patibility, reducing complexity, running low cost pilots, and making
the benefits of the innovation more observable.
From far away, the success of this approach will look like luck
or genius.  From up close, however, it is just a high quality empirical
framework plus hard work.
VI. INNOVATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS
Every legal innovator, early adopter and change agent shares a
common, unifying desire:  to speed up the pace of innovation within
their organization.
This statement is true whether the context is a law firm, legal
department, government agency, bar association, or law school.
Over the years, I have commiserated with them all.  Although they
don’t know it, their disappointment is rooted in the fact that organi-
zations are much harder to influence than individuals.  For better or
worse, organizations are everywhere within the legal ecosystem.
Thus, it would be extremely useful to understand what levers to pull
that can make them more innovative.  Figure 7, which appears be-
low, provides a way to consider this issue.
58. See generally BRIAN MERCHANT, THE ONE DEVICE: THE SECRET HIS-
TORY OF THE IPHONE (2017) (discussing hardships endured by Apple engineers as
part of the creation of the iPhone).
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FIGURE 7. ROGERS ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIVENESS MODEL
The model above, drawn from Chapter Ten of Diffusion of In-
novations, summarizes several factors that positively or negatively
affect an organization’s level of innovativeness.59  The model aggre-
gates the results of numerous empirical studies that utilize mul-
tivariate regression analysis.  However, just like the “rate of
adoption” model discussed in Section IV, Rogers conveys the key
findings using words rather than numbers.  This is because, as an
applied researcher, Rogers wants his analysis to be understood and
used by a smart lay audience.60
In the graphic above, the left side lists several independent
variables while the right side contains a single dependent variable.
Thus, it can be said that the level of organizational innovativeness
depends upon the values of several specific independent variables.
In very practical terms, the model tells us what categories of change
we should focus on to increase innovativeness within our organiza-
tions.  And, by implication, it tells us what not to do.  It is very hard
to overstate how useful this is.  In the early days of any innovation,
Rogers’s models (above and in Section IV) can serve as both a map
and a compass.  It is just plain foolish not to learn how to use them.
That said, to have a fair chance of success, readers need addi-
tional background knowledge on the challenges of organizational
innovativeness.  Thus, I am breaking this topic into three parts.
59. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 411 fig.10-2.
60. See supra Section I (explaining difference between applied and academic
research).
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Part I reviews the reasons why organizations tend to become bottle-
necks for innovations that are crucial to their long-term survival.
Part II discusses a very counterintuitive fact—that organizational
innovativeness is strongly correlated with size, even in law firms.
With this background information in place, Part III dives into the
details of Rogers’s innovativeness model (above) with special em-
phasis on how it applies to legal service organizations.
A. Organizations as Bottlenecks to Innovation
Innovators and early adopters are very interested in speeding
up the rate of adoption of innovations.  Rogers’s rate of adoption
model, which was set forth as Figure 4 in Section IV, sets forth
many factors that positively or negatively influence this outcome.
The model groups these factors into five distinct categories:  (I) per-
ceived attributes of innovation, (II) type of innovation-decision,
(III) quantity and quality of communication channels, (IV) nature
of social system, and (V) efforts of change agents.61
As noted earlier, the first category, “Perceived Attributes of
Innovation,” contains the biggest levers for change.62  This is be-
cause the five attributes identified in the research—higher relative
advantage, lower complexity, greater compatibility, use of pilot tri-
als, and increased observability for prospective adopters—explain
the majority of variation in rate adoption.  With sufficient quantities
of time, money and effort, innovators, early adopters, and change
agents can alter these factors in the right direction.63
Yet, for those of us working in the legal industry, “Type of In-
novation-Decision” is equally important.  This is because Type of
Innovation-Decision is essentially distinguishing between individual
and organizational adopters.  And the latter are (a) much more
common and economically influential within the legal industry, and
(b) more likely to result in adoption failure, particularly in the ab-
sence of significant planning and intervention.64
As noted in Section IV there are three types of innovation
adoption decisions:  (1) optional, (2) collective, and (3) authority.
If the adoption decision is optional, it’s akin to market forces:  indi-
61. See supra Figure 4.
62. See supra Section IV.
63. See supra Section IV (urging those favoring innovation to “focus your at-
tention on these five factors”); supra Section V (explaining “slow innovations”
based solely on these five factors).
64. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 405 (noting that innovation occurs “all the
time in most organizations,” but “many barriers and resistance to change exist in
an organization” as “[r]ules are enforced overzealously and applied to all cases in
an impersonal and inappropriate way”).
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viduals are free to take it or leave it (think Smartphone, Uber, or
wearables).  In contrast, when an organization is the adopter, either
collective or authority adoption decisions apply.
Collective is the most problematic decision type, as a collective
adoption decision requires some level of group consensus (think
law firm partnership or law school faculty).  Authority adoption de-
cisions are, in theory, easier because a single authority can decide
(think CEO or GC).  But successful implementation still depends
upon overcoming the opposition of the laggards and late majority.65
In summary, if you work in the legal industry and want to bring
about beneficial change, your success largely depends upon your
ability to work with, or within, organizations.  This is because good
ideas, unsheltered by a well-informed sponsor, are no match for the
strong anti-change headwinds created by organizational decision-
making.  This is a structural feature of the legal services industry
that consistently impedes organizational innovation.  On the other
hand, it is important to remember that innovation is never fore-
closed—not unless you and others give up.  For this ultramarathon
journey, Rogers’s models are essential survival tools.
That said, an important caveat is in order.  The predictive
power of Rogers’s organizational innovativeness model is much
lower than the predictive power of the rate of adoption model.
One of the main reasons for the lower predictive power is that fac-
tors that make an organization more likely to innovate are simulta-
neously factors that tend to undermine successful implementation.
Specifically, the likelihood of an organization deciding to adopt an
innovation is positively correlated with (i) lower centralization of
authority, (ii) higher complexity of work, and (iii) less formalization
of procedures.  Yet, these three attributes are negatively correlated
with successful implementation.
Obviously, very few organizations have the level of self-aware-
ness necessary to make appropriate mid-stream adjustments.  In-
stead, leaders try to power through obstacles with a one-size-fits-all
management approach.  In legal organizations in particular, when
an innovation fails, we place the blame on lawyers’ contentious,
skeptical, autonomy-loving nature.  This is a bogus, uninformed
analysis.  Fortunately, this pathetic cycle can be broken through
careful planning and leadership.
65. See supra Section III (defining adopter types).  Indeed, “massive passive
resistance” (MPR) awaits the executive who underinvests in team buy-in. See
supra Section IV (defining MPR and discussing its pervasiveness in corporate legal
departments).
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B. Recognizing the Different Factors that Promote Initiation
versus Implementation
Below is a graphic that summarizes the five stages of an inno-
vation adoption process in an organization.66  Notice that the adop-
tion decision is made only after a period of agenda-setting (Stage
#1) and matching (Stage #2).  Thereafter, the painstaking work of
implementation begins.
FIGURE 8
Note also that the model above essentially assumes that the innova-
tion process is managed by an existing bureaucracy, ostensibly just
one of many managerial duties.  The process begins with “Initia-
tion,” which consists of “all of the information gathering, conceptu-
alization, and planning for the adoption of the innovation, leading
up to the decision to adopt.”67  After the leadership makes the
adoption decision, the organization commences the “Implementa-
tion” phase.  This consists of “all the events, actions, and decisions
involved in putting the innovation to use.”68  When the innovation
is so integrated in the organization that it becomes routinized, it
“loses its identity” as something new.  In essence, the innovation
has merged into the status quo.
As noted above, several organizational attributes that support
successful initiation become sources of weakness during implemen-
66. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 421 fig.10–3.
67. Id. at 420–21.
68. Id. at 421.
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tation.  This should be very humbling to legal innovators and early
adopters who likely excel at initiation but are prone to underesti-
mate the hardships and complexities of successful implementation.
This tendency is explicitly discussed in the Silicon Valley classic
Crossing the Chasm by Jeffrey Moore.69  Moore’s solution is simple:
when the time comes, replace the innovator/early adopter manage-
ment team with more mainstream operators whose skill set is exe-
cution rather than ideation.70  For the opposite situation—when an
organization is very good at setting and following procedures but
struggles to innovate—Rogers suggests a “skunkworks project” as a
potential solution.71
Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that law firms,
which are the longstanding cornerstone of the legal industry, reflect
the worst of both worlds.  The partnership structure hinders both
successful initiation and implementation, not to mention making a
timely adoption decision.72  Yet, this is less a reason for hopeless-
ness than cause for careful study and preparation, at least among
those who intend to stay in the industry beyond the short to me-
dium-term.  Society has many hard problems.  This one belongs to
lawyers.
69. See MOORE, supra note 18, at 203 (noting that “pioneers” who can iden-
tify and develop great ideas “become a potential liability” once a company crosses
the chasm as “[t]heir fundamental interest is to innovate, not administrate”).
70. See id. at 203–09 (discussing necessity and process of replacement in both
manager and sales roles).
71. A skunkworks project is a project developed by a small and loosely struc-
tured group of people who research and develop a project primarily for the sake of
radical innovation. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 149.
72. See generally BRUCE MACEWEN, TOMORROWLAND: SCENARIOS FOR LAW
FIRMS BEYOND THE HORIZON (2017) (discussing at length the business liabilities
of governing a law firm as a partnership; suggesting that the partnership model will
become a source of numerous law firm failures).
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C. The Correlation between Organizational Size and
Innovativeness
FIGURE 9
The graphic above, adapted from Diffusion of Innovations,
shows the distribution of innovativeness among 324 German
banks.73  The innovativeness scale is a count of innovation adop-
tions from a universe of 12 interactive telecom innovations that
were diffusing through the German banking sector during the early
1990s.  To help distinguish the early adopters, more recent innova-
tions were weighted more heavily.  The distribution is a textbook
example of the Rogers Diffusion Curve.  The long innovators tail
exists because innovators are typically greater than two standard
deviations from the mean on innovativeness.74
Rogers uses this German bank study to illustrate numerous
factors associated with higher levels of organizational innovative-
ness.  One factor is size.
Specifically, the largest German banks accounted for a large
proportion of the innovators and early adopters.  In Rogers’s
dataset, the correlation between innovativeness and total assets was
73. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 410 fig.10-1.
74. See id. at 280–81 & fig.7-3 (presenting graphic and discussion where inno-
vators are “two standard deviations” from mean).
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a remarkable 0.75 (p < 0.01).75  Likewise, the correlation between
innovativeness and employee headcount was an equally stunning
0.70 (p < 0.01).76  If readers are wondering why I am surprised, it is
because the results are contrary to the standard trope that larger,
more mature, and more financially successful companies—be it
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, or technology—struggle with in-
novation.  Indeed, this is the very problem Clayton Christensen is
trying to solve in the Innovator’s Dilemma.77  The sections that fol-
low explain why this counterintuitive fact is true.
1. Deft Minds and the Size Effect
Everett Rogers had a remarkably deft mind that could puzzle
through seemingly contradictory data and, with enough time and
reflection, derive the most plausible causal story.  Chris Zorn, my
fellow co-founder at Lawyer Metrics (now LawyerMetrix), has a
similar rare ability, which is to say I have some hands-on experience
in this area.  Drawing upon this experience, let me gently set reader
expectations:  what is important in this section is analytically subtle
in a way that is not intuitive for most lawyers.
Let’s start with the size effect, which is present in Rogers’ study
of German banks.  The size effect is relevant to lawyers because (a)
there is credible, recent evidence that size is correlated with innova-
tiveness in law firms; and (b) as Rogers acknowledges, the higher
levels of innovativeness are, in most cases, substantially driven by
the “covariants” of size, rather than size itself.  It is this second
point that requires the deft researcher’s mind, but it can definitely
be grasped by patient, smart people.  So, hang in there.
2. The Altman Weil Law Firms in Transition Survey
Recent credible evidence of the size effect, which supports
Rogers’ German bank data, comes from the Altman Weil Law
Firms in Transition 2017 survey.78  The survey polled managing
partners and chairs at 798 U.S. law firms with 50 or more lawyers.
The response rate was 48 percent, including 50 percent of the NLJ
350 (ranking based on lawyer headcount) and 50 percent of the
AmLaw 200 (ranking based on gross revenues).
75. See Alwin Mahler & Everett Rogers, The Diffusion of Interactive Com-
munication Innovations and the Critcal Mass: The Adoption of Telecommunica-
tions Services by German Banks, 23 TELECOMM. POL’Y 719, 734 (1999).
76. See id.
77. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 31.
78. See 2017 Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, ALTMAN
WEIL (2017), http://www.altmanweil.com//dir_docs/resource/90D6291D-AB28-
4DFD-AC15-DBDEA6C31BE9_document.pdf.
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The knowledge management consultant Ron Friedmann con-
ducted a masterful secondary analysis of the survey results.79  One
of the survey questions asked law firm leaders, “[t]echnology tools
that incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning—
like Watson and Ross—are beginning to be adopted by some law
firms. What is your firm’s stance on the use of legal AI tools?”80
From the response data, Ron generated the chart below81:
FIGURE 10
This graphic shows a very strong relationship between law firm
size and the use of AI.  Over 50 percent of the 1,000+ lawyer firms
claim to have begun adoption.  Further, the effect is clearly linear,
with the level of use and exploration steadily declining with firm
size.  Drawing upon what we learned in Part I of this section, the
orange bars reflect the “initiation” phase and the blue bars reflect
“implementation.”  (Keep in mind that the implementation phase is
fraught with difficulties and often ends in failure.)
Further, the relationship between size and innovation is not
limited to AI.  We observe the same size/innovation effect in results
that show the linkage between alternative fee agreements or AFAs
79. Ron Friedmann, Law Firm Profitability + Service Delivery: What the Alt-
man Weil Survey Says, PRISM LEGAL (June 21, 2017), http://prismlegal.com/law-
firm-profitability-service-delivery-what-the-altman-weil-survey-says/.
80. Survey, supra note 78, at 84.
81. Friedmann, supra note 79.
436 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:395
and changes in how work is being staffed and delivered.  The
graphic below was also generated by Ron Friedmann:82
FIGURE 11
The reader may be asking, “[w]hy is linking AFAs to staffing
and service delivery so innovative?”  The answer is “[b]ecause the
real value of alternative fees is to incentivize a re-design of work-
flow that (i) increases quality, (ii) speeds up delivery, and (iii) de-
creases cost.”  Otherwise, alternative fees become either a price
discount or a gamble with poor or unknown odds.  Stated another
way, there is no point in hiring a pricing specialist unless you’re also
going to hire specialists in project management and process
improvement.
3. Covariants to Size, not Size Itself
The graphics above reveal a clear and meaningful relationship
between size and innovativeness.  Yet, it does not necessarily follow
that increasing size will increase innovation.  Correlation, as they
say, is not causation.  Instead, it may be the case that other actions
or activities need to be taken to improve or enable innovation; and
for a variety of reasons, those actions or activities are more likely to
occur in a larger firm.
To illustrate, let’s return to Rogers’s Organizational Innova-
tiveness model presented in Figure 7.  In category II, which is enti-
tled Internal Characteristics of Organizational Structure, there are
six factors (i.e., independent variables) listed, with size being num-
ber six.  In Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers asks the question,
“[w]hy do researchers consistently find that size is one of the best
82. Id.
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predictors of organizational innovativeness?”83  The first reason,
writes Rogers, it that size is easy to measure with precision and thus
“is included for study in almost every organizational innovativeness
investigation.”  Rogers continues:
Second, size is probably a surrogate measure of several dimen-
sions that lead to innovation:  total resources, slack resources
(defined as the degree to which an organization has more re-
sources than those required for ongoing operations), employees’
technical expertise, organizational structure, and so on.  These
unidentified variables have not been clearly understood or ade-
quately measured by most studies.  These “lurking” variables
may be a fundamental reason for the common finding that size
and innovativeness are related.84
These “lurking” variables are covariants—i.e., attributes that
generally move in a linear relationship with one another, either pos-
itively (height and weight) or negatively (age and memory).  Al-
though there will be counter examples, covariants generally move in
a linear relationship with one another.  Thankfully, when we have a
lot of potentially meaningful variables that are correlated with one
another, we can sort out what matters, by direction of effect and
magnitude, through multivariate models.  In this case, factors one
through five in Rogers’s Figure 4 model reveal the more valuable
insights.  We will carefully review those factors in Part III.
D. Applying and Interpreting Rogers’s Organizational
Innovativeness Model
FIGURE 12
The graphic above reflects three different types of innovation
“outcomes”:
83. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 411.
84. Id.
438 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:395
Panel 1 shows INITIATION of an innovation adoption process that
results in an organization making a decision to adopt an
innovation.
Panel 2 shows IMPLEMENTATION of the adoption decision, which
entails planning, change management, and redefining/restructur-
ing and clarifying the innovation in the field so that it delivers its
intended benefits.
Panel 3 shows ADOPTION SUCCESS, which presumes success in
both initiation and implementation.
As we look at the patterns presented by these three panels, we ob-
served a very difficult organizational challenge.  Centralized man-
agement decision-making impacts the three innovation outcomes
differently.  During the initiation phase, centralization has a strong
negative correlation with the outcome (Panel 1).  During imple-
mentation, the relationship is moderately positive (Panel 2).  The
two opposing effects are then netted out in Panel 3.  The result is a
statistically weak and moderately negative relationship between
centralization and overall adoption success.
So, what does this mean?  If we want more innovation in our
organizations, we need to forgo a one-size-fits-all approach to man-
agement in favor of a staged approach.  The staged approach is nec-
essary because several factors in Rogers’s organizational
innovativeness model, introduced in Part I and reproduced below,
have this peculiar flipping effect between initiation and implemen-
tation:  (i) Centralization, (ii) Complexity, and (iii) Formalization.
This is one of the primary reasons that Rogers’s model has rela-
tively low predictive power.85
Yet, we can adjust to these limitations through the application
of our reasoning ability.  Consistent with the staged strategy dis-
cussed above, this analysis assumes that organizational innovation
requires successful initiation (agenda setting and matching) and
successful implementation (redesigning/restructuring, clarifying,
and routinizing) as presented in Figure 8 above.  An analysis of
Rogers’ data and conclusions provides clear prescriptive guidance
on how to increase successful innovation adoption in legal organiza-
tions.  To the extent possible, the analysis that follows uses specific
legal industry examples.
85. See supra Section VI (A) (“The predictive power of Rogers’s organiza-
tional innovativeness model is much lower than the predictive power of the rate of
adoption model”).
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Rogers’s models focus on applied research.  This means we
mine empirical models for usable insights while taking careful note
of their constraints and limitations.  Thereafter, we use the resulting
superior knowledge as part of a reasoning process to solve practical
problems.86
Below is the superior knowledge provided by Rogers’s organi-
zational innovativeness model.
1. Category I:  Individual (Leader) Characteristics—Champions
The first category of variables that influences organizational in-
novativeness is the presence or absence of innovation champions.
An innovation champion is “a charismatic individual who throws
his or her weight behind an innovation, thus overcoming indiffer-
ence or resistance that the idea might provoke in the
organization.”87
The champion could be a leader in a formal position of author-
ity (president, vice-president, manager, etc.), but not always.  As
Rogers notes, “The general picture of an innovation champion
emerges not as a particularly powerful individual in the organiza-
tion, but rather as someone particularly adept at handling peo-
ple.”88  Roger cites research showing the effective champions (1)
tend to occupy a “linking” position in their organization; (2) possess
analytical and intuitive skills in understanding various individuals’
aspirations; and (3) demonstrate well-honed interpersonal skills in
negotiating with others.
It is easy to imagine how a smart, well-connected person with
high EQ could be very effective in rallying enthusiasm during initia-
tion and thereafter managing conflict and mediating solutions dur-
ing implementation.  Although the presence of such champions
does not guarantee organizational innovativeness, Rogers suggests
that their absence likely forecloses it, particularly in cases involving
non-incremental change.  “The new idea either finds a champion or
it dies.”89
86. See supra Section I (explaining difference between applied and academic
research).
87. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 414.
88. Id. at 415.
89. Id. at 414 (quoting Donald Schon, Champions for Radical New Inventions,
41 HARV. BUS. REV. 77, 84 (1963)).
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2. Category II:  Internal Characteristics of Organizational
Structure
Various internal characteristics of organizational structure
comprise the second category of variables that affect organizational
innovativeness.
a. Centralization (-)
Centralization is “the degree to which power and control in a
system are concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individu-
als.”90  As noted in Parts I and II, higher levels of centralization
tend to have a negative impact on initiation.  Yet, if centralized
management can nonetheless manage to adopt an innovation, cen-
tralized decision making can aid its implementation.  The overall
net effect, however, is negative.  This is because senior organiza-
tional leaders tend to be too far removed from operational-level
problems to identify relevant and workable innovations.
In my work with law firms, I have been surprised to find sev-
eral examples of law firms that flourish economically because lead-
ers have adopted a strategy of “letting partners do what they want.”
In most cases, the resulting innovations take the form of specialized
practices where partners command premium rates for providing
fast, high-quality solutions that solve difficult client problems.  The
entrepreneurism consists of paying close attention to how substan-
tive legal issues are impacting clients’ business needs and being the
first to create a novel legal solution.  Although this decentralized
approach can result in a sizable collection of lucrative niche prac-
tices, it likely undercuts potentially important firm-wide innova-
tions such as project management and process improvement.
To cite another legal example, the decentralization of faculty
governance in legal education results in many symposia to generate
new ideas.  However, we are completely lacking in effective central
mechanisms for coordinating implementation.  Hence our reputa-
tion for being stuck in the past.
b. Complexity (+)
Complexity is “the degree to which an organization’s members
possess a relatively high level of knowledge and expertise, usually
measured by the members’ range of occupational specialities and
their degree of professionalism (expressed by formal training).”91
Rogers notes that a highly educated workforce is more likely to
90. Id. at 412.
91. Id.
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grasp the value of innovations.  However, the higher levels of com-
plexity make it more difficult to reach consensus on implementa-
tion.  Thus, the net effect of complexity on organizational
innovativeness is positive but not particularly strong.
Below is a graphic that shows the complexity relationship by
phase.
FIGURE 13
In law firms and legal departments, there is a strong movement
to hire allied professionals trained in a wide range of useful disci-
plines.  This trend of mixing of professional perspectives is bound to
raise the quality of innovative thinking and responses to complex-
ity.  Translating these new ideas into effective action will be the
core challenge of the next generation of legal professionals.92  To
cope with the Panel 2 complexity challenge, the legal industry is
undoubtedly headed into an era of standard-setting and standardi-
zation.  This is going to produce a cultural sea change within the
organized legal profession.
c. Formalization (-)
Formalization is “the degree to which an organization empha-
sizes its members’ following rules and procedures.”93  This internal
organizational attribute has an impact that is very similar to central-
ization—strongly hindering initiation, aiding implementation, and
overall having a net negative impact on successful adoption.
In the legal industry, we see the highest levels of formalization
among the managed service providers.  In this context, new entrants
come on the scene with a core competence in designing and follow-
ing process.  The high level of formalization results in legal work
with fewer errors, lower cost, and faster delivery time.  This empha-
92. See Henderson, Six Types, supra note 45  (discussing growing size and
complexity of corporate legal departments and the rapid growth of CLOC).
93. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 412.
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sis on process also enables more predictable schedules and greater
work-life balance.  This is a valuable differentiator to attract and
retain talent.94
d. Interconnectedness (+)
Interconnectedness is “the degree to which the units in a social
system are linked by interpersonal networks.”95  The more inter-
connected the interpersonal networks are, the greater the organiza-
tional innovativeness will be.  This is because interpersonal
networks tend to be very influential channels for sharing informa-
tion, as trust and credibility levels are high.  An organization can
broaden and deepen these networks through the architecture of its
office space and by investing in regular inter-office meetings.
Interconnectedness is probably an attribute that legal service
organizations tend to undervalue, wanting to avoid the lost time
and expense of bringing professionals together for learning and so-
cializing.  Yet, I was recently surprised to learn that one of the ma-
jor benefits of Milbank@Harvard, an intensive annual business
training program for Milbank associates that lasts for several years,
is that associates in the United States, Europe, and Asia offices get
to know one another in ways that spur trust, collaboration, and in-
novation.  Ironically, these benefits were not part of the original
business case for the program.  They are just a welcomed second-
order effect.96
e. Organizational slack (+)
Organizational slack “is the degree to which uncommitted re-
sources are available to an organization.”97  The greater the organi-
zational slack, the higher the level of organizational innovativeness,
“especially for innovations that are higher in cost.”98  Rogers specu-
lates that larger organizations may be more innovative because the
94. See Bill Henderson, World Class Innovation and Efficiency, Billed by the
Hour (010), LEGAL EVOLUTION (June 18, 2017), https://www.legalevolution.org/
2017/06/world-class-innovation-efficiency-billed-hour-010/ (“In addition to a pro-
fessional wage, a collegial work environment, and freedom from business develop-
ment pressures, lawyers in the managed service sector can refuse work outside the
bounds of a 40-hour workweek.”).
95. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 412.
96. For additional information on Milbank@Harvard, see Bill Henderson, An
Update on Milbank’s Big Bet, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Nov. 13, 2013), http://lawpro
fessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/11/an-update-on-milbanks-big-bet.html.
97. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 412.
98. Id.
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aggregate levels of downtime are bound to be greater.  To use a
sports metaphor, taking more shots usually results in more baskets.
Companies like 3M, Google, and HP have all adopted innova-
tion strategies based on unstructured free time for knowledge
workers.99  However, in most of the legal world, 100 percent utiliza-
tion is the perennial holy grail.  Exceptions are hard to find.
That said, the law firm Bryan Cave is an interesting accidental
example.  In the late 1990s, John Alber, the firm’s longtime innova-
tion partner, returned to the firm after the sale of his logistics com-
pany.  After fixing the firm’s failing IT system, Alber assisted on a
client request for an expert system on international trade regula-
tions (albeit no one called it that at the time).  Although Alber had
no formal staff, he found someone in the IT department with free
time to help.  The client was very happy with the resulting technol-
ogy-based solution, thus starting a John Alber/Bryan Cave winning
streak that lasted 17 years and resulted in numerous industry
awards for innovation.  The IT staffer with free time was Chris
Emerson, who went on to get an MBA.  Emerson now runs Bryan
Cave’s renowned Practice Economics Group (or PEG).
Another law firm example (from India, not the UnitedStates)
is Nistith Desai & Associates (NDA), a firm with numerous FT In-
novative Lawyer awards in the Asia-Pacific bracket.100  Founded in
1989, the 200+ lawyer firm is based on the principle of continuous
learning.  Every lawyer, including the firm’s founder, is expected to
be involved in the firm’s daily hour-long educational programming,
both as a student and content provider.  NDA essentially mandates
slack time in service of creative solutions.  While virtually all law
firms are reactive to client problems, NDA’s model is based on the
proactive anticipate/prepare/deliver model show below.  Not sur-
prisingly, NDA uses value-based billing.
99. See, e.g., Kaomi Goetz, How 3M Gave Everyone Days Off and Created an
Innovation Dynamo, CO.DESIGN (Feb. 2, 2011), www.fastcodesign.com/1663137/
how-3m-gave-everyone-days-off-and-created-an-innovation-dynamo.
100. See Long List, available at rankings.ft.com/asianlawyers/nishith-desai-
associates.
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FIGURE 14. NISTITH DESAI PRACTICE MODEL
In late 2017, NDA unveiled its new R&D facility on a four-
acre, state-of-the-art campus located on the outskirts of Mumbai.
The new facility is referred to as the Blue Sky Thinking Center.
The founder of the firm, Nistith Desai, claims to have built NDA
based on a composite of the very best professional services firms,
including Wachtell Lipton.101
f. Size (+)
Section VI(C), supra, focused on the relationship between an
organization’s size and its organizational innovativeness.  Rogers
viewed size as mostly a proxy or surrogate for other important fac-
tors, such as overall resources, complexity, and organizational
slack.102
Although increased size means additional layers of bureau-
cracy and higher communication overhead, the benefits can often
outweigh the costs.  The highly innovative Corporate Legal Opera-
tions Consortium (CLOC) was certainly enabled by the size and
scale of modern legal departments.103  Section VI(C) also presented
compelling evidence that larger firms are ahead on AI and other
practice management innovations.  This is almost certainly the re-
sult of more resources.
101. For an interesting discussion of the firm’s origins and operating princi-
ples, see Nistith Desai, Management by Trust  in  a  Democratic  Enterprise: A  Law
Firm  ShapesOrganizational  Behavior to Create Competitive Advantage, 28
GLOBAL BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE 7 (Sept./Oct. 2009).
102. ROGERS, supra note 5, at (explaining that “size is probably a surrogate
measure of several dimensions that lead to innovation” including “total resources”,
“slack resources”, and “employees’ technical expertise”).
103. See Henderson, Six Types, supra note 45 (observing that many legal de-
partments have become “the equivalent of a specialized law firm embedded inside
a large corporation”).
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To drive home this point, imagine a firm allocating two percent
of revenues to invest in people, process, technology, and data.  In a
firm with $1.7 billion in revenues (the average of AmLaw 1–20),
that amounts to $34 million.  In a firm of $100 million (the average
of AmLaw 181–200), two percent equals $2 million.  Whatever the
benefits of being smaller and more nimble, smaller firms are not
well-positioned to attract and retain a critical mass of specialized
talent.104
Yet, in my experience, size very much interacts with firm scope.
Specifically, when a firm narrows its areas of substantive practice,
the innovation quotient can skyrocket despite not having AmLaw
1–20 revenues.  Littler Mendelson (labor and employment),
Fragomen (immigration), and Chapman & Cutler (financial ser-
vices) all fit this profile.  Higher levels of innovation are enabled by
focus and partner alignment—the firm rises and falls by its domi-
nance in a single practice area.105
3. Category III:  External Characteristics of Organization—
System Openness (+)
This category of variables is very simple conceptually:  does the
organization proactively open itself to new ideas that could solve or
mitigate important strategic problems?  Compared to other indus-
tries, legal service organizations score low on this dimension.
Roger writes, “[m]ost organizations engage in an opportunistic
surveillance by scanning the environment for new ideas that might
benefit the organization.”106  When it’s working well, “[a]nswers
often precede questions.”107  What Rogers is getting at is aware-
ness-knowledge, defined as “information that an innovation ex-
ists.”108  Awareness-knowledge is obviously impeded by closed
systems.  Lawyers are disadvantaged here on several fronts:
• Ban on outside investment. The Rule 5.4 prohibition on non-
lawyer investment means that lawyers cannot co-venture with
104. See, e.g., Update from Baker & McKenzie’s Chief  Strategy Officer in
Germany, LINKEDIN, July 2017, online at https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/
urn:li:activity:6295731864103714816/ (during  a day of onboarding, welcoming a
“diverse group of lawyers, paralegals, business professionals, economists, data ana-
lysts, data visualizers, digital marketing  experts”).
105. Cf. Lizzy, McLellan, Fragomen to Launch Unique Tech Development
Center in Pittsburgh, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (July 3, 2017), https://www.law.com/
thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202792153605/ (suggesting that all companies, includ-
ing law firms, are destined “to become a tech company in some capacity”).
106. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 422.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 173.
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other professionals, thus cutting lawyers off from valuable per-
spectives and learning.109
• Culture of immediate productivity. The legal industry, particu-
larly in the United States, is strongly oriented toward produc-
tion.  As a result, eclectic reading, conference travel, and
sustained high-level training and programming is often viewed
as extravagant, as budget targets are high and the time is non-
billable.  Unfortunately, this ethos carries over into many legal
departments.  In-house counsel are largely firefighters.  All too
often, they lack the time, resources, and mindset to prevent
fires.
• Lawyer-centricity. All too frequently, lawyers refuse to accord
legitimacy to the views of people who don’t possess a law de-
gree (and hence are “non-lawyers”).  This is a recurring theme
among allied professionals who work in the legal industry.
Pros:  high pay.  Cons:  routinely ignored or dismissed by
lawyers.
If a legal organization wants to be more innovative, it can
change some of these factors through enlightened leadership.  In
the long run, lower levels of innovations are ruinous to entire orga-
nizations and industries.  A fiduciary cannot responsibly ignore
these issues.
Finally, whatever I’ve just written about law firms and legal
departments (the topic is organizations) applies to legal education.
To this day, I am struck by the lack of academic participation in
organizations and events on the front lines of change, such as
CLOC, ILTA, and LegalWeek.  The economic rules of modern
practice are poised to get rewritten.  Once this happens, a lot of
cheese is going to get moved.110
4. Relative Importance of Rogers’s Organizational Innovativeness
Model
Assuming you’re an innovator or early adopter who wants to
use Rogers’s models to improve your organization, the following
question is relevant:  What is the relative importance of the organi-
zational innovativeness model (analyzed above) compared to the
rate of adoption model in Section IV, Figure 4?
We don’t have systematic empirical data to answer this ques-
tion, but we do have one article worthy of mention.  In a study of 25
109. See MODEL RULE 5.4, supra note 50.
110. For one of the all-time best-selling change management books, see gen-
erally SPENCER JOHNSON, WHO MOVED MY CHEESE? AN AMAZING WAY TO
DEAL WITH CHANGE IN YOUR WORK AND IN YOUR LIFE (1998).
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hospitals that were adopting 12 new technologies in a midwestern
city, the dependent variable (outcome) was a nine-point scale rang-
ing from “staff being aware of an innovation (one point) through
adopting and using the innovation regularly (eight points) to ex-
panding and upgrading the new technology (nine points).”111  In ef-
fect, the scale is measuring the progression through the entire
innovation adoption process, from the early stages of initiation to
complete implementation success.112  This is an ideal dependent
variable.
The study authors found:
• 40 percent of the variance explained by the perceived attrib-
utes of the innovations, with observability, low risk, and low
complexity being key.
• 11 percent of the variance explained by organizational innova-
tiveness factors, with CEOs as innovation champions and
larger hospitals with more aggressive marketing strategies be-
ing the most influential attributes.113
What’s my advice?  In both models, systematically explore
cost-effective ways to influence every variable in the direction that
will make success more likely.  This is how applied research works.
111. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 414.
112. See supra Figure 8.
113. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 414 (citing Alan D. Meyer & James B.
Goes, Organizational Assimilation of Innovations: A Multilevel Contextual Analy-
sis, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 897 (1988)).
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FIGURE 15 THE NUMBER OF NEW ADOPTERS EACH YEAR, AND
THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ADOPTERS, OF
HYBRID SEED CORN IN TWO IOWA COMMUNITIES
VII. CHANGE AGENTS AND OPINION LEADERS
The chart above, drawn from Diffusion of Innovations, shows
the adoption of hybrid seed corn by farmers in two Iowa communi-
ties.114  The dashed line on the bottom shows the number of adop-
tions by year.  The solid line on top shows adoption on a cumulative
basis.  The first farmer in the sample adopted hybrid seed corn in
1927.  Fifteen years later, in 1941, the last four farmers made the
switch.
The dashed line is a real-world example of a Rogers Diffusion
Curve.115  Likewise, the solid line is a real-world example of the S-
shaped curve.  The farmers switched to hybrid seed corn because it
was more bountiful, disease resistant, and drought resistant than
traditional methods.  The chart above is useful because it shows the
common diffusion pattern of (1) a prolonged period of slow adop-
114. Id. at 273 fig.7-1.
115. See supra Section II (discussing curve); supra Section III (discussing
adopter types).
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tion, even for a highly advantageous innovation; and (2) a short pe-
riod of rapid adoption.116
In the case of the Iowa farmers, the prolonged period of slow
adoption was not a random event.  Few if any farmers would have
adopted hybrid seed corn but for agronomists from Iowa universi-
ties.  The agronomists were necessary to help the innovator and
early adopter farmers understand and use this new technology.
When some of the more influential early adopter farmers met with
success, they shared their experiences with other farmers.  As the
benefits of the innovation were experienced by the early majority
farmers, adoption spread like a social contagion through the two
Iowa communities.
In this real-life example, the university agronomists were the
change agents.  And the influential early adopter farmers were the
opinion leaders.  This section explains the crucial role played by
these two types of actors.  It also emphasizes how these concepts
apply to the current challenges facing the legal industry.
Readers seeking to influence innovation within the legal indus-
try will be more successful if they obtain and apply the background
knowledge found in this section.  I have taken care to make this
information non-technical and accessible.
A. Awareness-Knowledge
Before the farmers could adopt hybrid seed corn, they needed
“awareness-knowledge,” which is knowledge that such a technology
exists.  However, there can be a considerable lag between aware-
ness-knowledge and actual adoption of a new innovation.  This dy-
namic is captured above in Figure 6, which was based on the same
study of Iowa farmers.  It was presented earlier to illustrate Rog-
ers’s rate of adoption model.
For the typical farmer, roughly six years elapsed between hear-
ing about hybrid seed corn and adopting it.  In addition to inexperi-
ence and uncertainty with hybrid seeds, the lag time was due to the
sheer novelty of the innovation, which was rooted in laboratory sci-
ence and was at odds with longstanding views regarding how to
grow the best corn.117
In the early 20th century, agricultural production was a matter
of national security, as World War I had driven home the impor-
tance of a secure and bountiful domestic food supply.  Farmers had
116. See supra Figure 9 (showing histogram with long innovator tail).
117. See supra Section IV (discussing how complexity and cultural incompati-
bility can impede adoption of innovations).
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also become a formidable legislative lobby.  Thus by 1920, there
were more than 3,000 agricultural extension workers funded by a
mix of federal, state, and county agencies.
Remarkably, despite the benefit of a large and well-financed
change establishment delivering an innovation that was an unal-
loyed benefit to farmers, the uptake was far from rapid.  The key
sociological question was “why?”  The parallel applied research
question was “can the rate of adoption be accelerated?”  The an-
swer to the latter question was yes, thus creating foundational re-
search that would eventually result in a general theory for how
innovation diffuses.
B. Early versus Middle-Late Diffusion:  The S-shaped Curve
Diffusion theory is part of an applied research tradition that
seeks to enable change strategies that work in a controlled and pre-
dictable way.  The core insight is that the diffusion of an innovation
is a process that occurs through a social system.118  In most cases,
the process begins with a need or problem and a desire by some
members of the social system to find and implement a solution.
For the purposes of this section, we can divide the diffusion
process into two stages:  an early stage, characterized by a relatively
long period of slow adoption (base of the S-shaped curve in Figure
15 that starts with the long innovators tail); and a middle-late stage,
characterized by rapid adoption over a relatively short period (the
steep portion of the S-shaped curve followed by a plateau).
Between these two stages, the early stage is far more tenuous
and fragile.  This is because it requires a member of the social sys-
tem to (1) obtain knowledge of an innovation; (2) evaluate its rela-
tive benefits and costs; (3) make an affirmative adoption decision;
(4) successfully implement the innovation; and (5) confirm the exis-
tence of the desired results.  In substance, this is a time-consuming
and potentially expensive experiment that could fail.  Obviously,
only a sub-segment of any population would be willing and/or able
to bear this risk.
In Figure 15, the early stage would roughly correspond to the
1924 to 1933 time period.  Many farmers had heard about hybrid
seed corn, but only a handful had adopted it.  The early stage typi-
cally comes to an end when the social system’s opinion leaders be-
come part of the adopter group and can vouch for the innovation’s
effectiveness.  Rogers writes, “the [cumulative] diffusion curve is S-
shaped because once opinion leaders adopt and begin telling others
118. See supra Section IV (discussing Rogers Diffusion Curve).
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about an innovation, the number of adopters per unit of time takes
off in an exponential curve.”119
The middle-late stage of diffusion begins with the rapid ascen-
sion of the S-shaped curve (1934 to 1941).  In Diffusion of Innova-
tions, Rogers discusses the concept of “critical mass,” which is the
point at which enough adoption has occurred and further adoption
becomes “self-sustaining.”
[T]he heart of the diffusion process is the modeling and imitation
by potential adopters of their near peers’ experiences with the
new idea.  In deciding whether or not to adopt an innovation,
individuals depend mainly on the communicated experience of
others much like themselves . . . .  These subjective evaluations of
an innovation flow mainly through interpersonal networks.120
On a micro-level, change is occurring because individuals are
observing each other and responding to social proof.  Each individ-
ual in the social system has a “threshold” of proof needed to spur
change.  Once the middle-late stage of diffusion is reached—i.e.,
the steep part of the S-shaped curve—the adoption process be-
comes less deliberative and more imitation of people in their close
social network.  Thus, adoption moves like dominoes from early
adopters to the early majority to the late majority to the laggards.
Although thresholds operate at an individual level and vary by
adopter type, at a system level, their aggregate effect is to create a
critical mass that leads to a tipping point.
In the case of culturally novel and complex innovations, critical
mass is seldom reached without the participation of opinion leaders.
Thus, it is important to understand their characteristics and
attributes.
C. Opinion Leaders
Opinion leaders are rarely innovators and are not necessarily
early adopters.  Their relative position among the five adopter types
depends upon the norms of the social system.  Within the tradition-
bound legal industry, opinion leaders may be members of the early
majority, refusing to adopt change without a very high standard of
proof.
Rogers defines opinion leadership as “the degree to which an
individual is able to informally influence other individuals’ attitudes
or overt behavior in a desired way with relative frequency.”121
119. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 300.
120. Id. at 330–31.
121. Id. at 388.
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Thus, among corporate law firms, Cravath Swaine & Moore is
clearly an opinion leader.122  Likewise, Harvard Law leads the way
in legal education.123  Yet, neither institution is widely viewed as an
early adopter.  In less conservative social systems, however, the
overlap between opinion leaders and early adopters would be sig-
nificantly larger.124
A key feature of opinion leaders—and one that usually renders
innovators unfit for the role—is their strong conformity to social
system norms.  Respect for norms is necessary to obtain the trust
and allegiance of other adopter types.  Note that the value at play
here may be less about innovation than power and influence, as
opinion leaders can be disregarded or toppled.  Rogers writes:
The interpersonal relationships between opinion leaders and fol-
lowers hang in a delicate balance.  If an opinion leader becomes
too innovative, or adopts a new idea too quickly, followers may
begin to doubt his or her judgment.  One role of the opinion
leader in the social system is to help reduce uncertainty about an
innovation . . . .  To fulfill this role, an opinion leader must
demonstrate prudent judgment decisions about adopting new
ideas.  So the opinion leader must continually look over his or
her shoulder and consider where the rest of the system is regard-
ing new ideas.125
On balance, however, opinion leaders tend to be distinguished
by several attributes, at least as compared to other members of the
social system.  Opinion leaders tend to have:
1. greater connections to the outside world (more
“cosmopolite”)
2. greater exposure to diverse media
3. higher levels of social engagement
4. higher socioeconomic status
5. higher innovativeness than followers
6. greater exposure to change agents
Regarding point six, below is a bar chart showing the average
number of change agent contacts per year for a group of farmers in
122. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Cravath Raising Starting Salaries to $180,000,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2016 (reporting that “[c]hange is likely to spawn a wave of
copycat moves”).
123. See Michael Levenson, Harvard Law is Now Accepting the GRE. Could
Other Schools Follow?, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2017.
124. Cf. supra Section VI (discussing the influence and sway of early
adopters).
125. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 319.
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Brazil.  It is drawn from an agricultural diffusion study conducted
by Rogers and other researchers.
FIGURE 16 Averages Number of Contacts with Change Agents
per Year
The key takeaway from this chart is that change agents are
sources of innovative ideas.  Rogers demonstrates the empirical
connection between Mark Granovetter’s Strength-of-Weak-Ties
theory and access to high-impact information.126  In Granovetter’s
well-known study of how people found employment,127 connections
to far-flung cliques and social groups, albeit weak, were far more
powerful than local networks of friends and family.  Thus, periph-
eral “weak” ties tend to be more informationally rich than the
dense connections at the center of the social system.
Change agents and their ideas enter a social system through
these weak ties.  Although change agents find the greatest receptiv-
ity with innovators, their success often hinges upon their ability to
influence opinion leaders.
126. See id. at 339–41 (discussing relevance of Granovetter’s work to diffusion
theory (citing Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC.
1360 (1973))).
127. See MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS
AND CAREERS (1974).
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D. Change Agents
A change agent is defined as “an individual who influences cli-
ents’ innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a
change agency.”128  Their biggest impact is felt during the tenuous
early stage of diffusion.
In the agricultural study, the change agents were government-
funded university agronomists who were hired to help farmers
adopt new technology.  The goal was to boost agricultural produc-
tion.  However, in other contexts, change agents could be public
health workers trying to reduce the spread of HIV; teachers intro-
ducing new curricula and materials to public schools as part of a
broader “new math” movement; or salespeople selling enterprise
software to large organizations.  Indeed, this last example became
the basis for the Silicon Valley classic, Crossing the Chasm,129 that
I’ll discuss in the next and final section.
In cases of complex or novel innovations, change agents are
necessary to fill gaps in technical knowledge and know-how.  These
change agents typically have a significantly greater technical com-
petence than members of the “client” social system.  Unfortunately,
this superior know-how often creates communication and cultural
gaps that are difficult to bridge.  This phenomenon is very much
present in the legal industry circa 2018 as lawyers and legal educa-
tors struggle to learn new work methods grounded in data, process,
and technology.  The gap is undoubtedly the most visible with artifi-
cial intelligence.
E. The Tradeoff between Information Impact and
Communication Ease
Communication and cultural gaps are most likely to occur
when change agents are very dissimilar from members of the social
system.  A straightforward example would be lawyers needing to
learn technical information from data scientists, software develop-
ers, and process engineers.  This dissimilarity is referred to as
“heterophily.”130  Although there is an enormous breadth of knowl-
edge in these pairings, and thus the latent potential for high-impact
knowledge transfer, communication tends to be slow, arduous, and
uncomfortable.  Thus, except among innovators and early adopters,
persistence in heterophilous pairings is rare.
128. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 27.
129. See MOORE, supra note 18.
130. See text accompanying note 52, supra Section IV(E).
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Conversely, when two individuals are very similar
(homophily), such as two lawyers who attended the same law
school and work in the same area of law, any communication gap is
likely to be small or non-existent.  Unfortunately, that pairing is un-
likely to transmit high-impact information, as their base of knowl-
edge is too similar.131  Thus, in a very real sense, law firms, legal
departments, and law faculty cannot be leaders in innovation if
their information gathering and strategizing is substantially limited
to high-level meetings among lawyers.  Remarkably, many will try.
The diagram below illustrates the conundrum.
FIGURE 17
On the far left side of the diagram, the transfer of high-impact
information is impeded by significant communication and cultural
gaps between change agents and members of the social system.
Simply stated, they are too dissimilar to connect.  On the far right
side, communication is easy and fluid, but there is little or no novel
information to share.  However, when an effective change agent
works with innovators and early adopters and, eventually, receptive
opinion leaders, a knowledge-rich exchange is possible (center left).
After that, diffusion continues, with the early majority, late major-
ity, and laggards adopting based on interactions within the social
system (center right).132
131. Cf. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008) (economist
demonstrating that diverse teams outperform homogenous teams on tasks requir-
ing creativity and innovation).
132. See supra Section III (profiling the five adopter types).
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F. Effective Change Agents
The theory of change agents may seem relatively simple.  How-
ever, when the desired change is complex and impinges on social
and cultural norms, the change agent’s job is enormously difficult.
Rogers observes:
In addition to facing this problem with social marginality, change
agents also must deal with the problem of information overload,
the state of an individual or a system in which excessive commu-
nication inputs cannot be processed and utilized, leading to
breakdown. . . .  By understanding the needs of the clients, the
change agent can selectively transmit to them only information
that is relevant.133
My own interest in diffusion theory was borne of my six years
at Lawyer Metrics.134  As an applied research company, we created
data analytics tools for legal service organizations.  Although the
company had PhD social scientists who could build highly sophisti-
cated quantitative models, our biggest challenge was finding ways
to present data that lawyers could process, understand, and accept.
On many occasions, we quipped that the statistical work was simple
by comparison.
As I survey the legal landscape in 2018, I see the same chal-
lenges affecting many legal tech start-ups.  Most early stage entre-
preneurs emphasize the technical features of their product because
they know and love its full range of capabilities.  Yet, this perspec-
tive places them at a high risk of failure.
Below is a model of change agent effectiveness based on Chap-
ter Nine of Diffusion of Innovations.  Suffice it to say, it fully aligns
with my professional experience.
133. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 368–69.
134. See supra Section II (discussing time at Lawyer Metrics).
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FIGURE 18
The original rate of adoption model in Figure 4 listed five cate-
gories of variables that influence the rate of innovation adoption.
The fifth category was “Efforts of Changes Agents.”  The model in
Figure 18 provides additional detail for that category.135
1. Making contact with clients (+). Frequent contact builds fa-
miliarity and creates opportunities to establish credibility and
trust.
2. Client orientation (+). Is the change agent trying to solve the
clients’ problem or trying to advance their own agenda (e.g.,
make a sale)?  If the change agent is listening, they can learn
ways to modify and improve their innovation.
3. Client empathy (+). A change agent is more effective when
it can see the world through the eyes of the client.
4. Homophily with clients (+). Can the change agent look and
act like an insider?  In the legal industry, change agents with
law degrees generally have an easier time because of a com-
mon experience and background with most clients.
5. Credibility in the clients’ eyes (+). Can you fluidly answer
tough questions?  If the client must trust the change agents’
judgment, do the change agents possess the credentials and
background to understand the underlying innovation?
6. Working thru Opinion Leaders (+). Rogers observes, “[t]he
time and energy of the change agents are scarce re-
sources.”136  Engaging opinion leaders is the most efficient
path to systemwide success.
7. Improving technical competence of clients (+). Clients dis-
like long-term dependency on change agents.  Thus, effective
change agents often make education the cornerstone of their
135. Cf. supra Section V (discussing importance of the first category, “Per-
ceived Attributes of Innovation,” to explain the difference between fast and slow
innovations, even when the innovations at issue can save human life).
136. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 338.
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efforts, which builds trust and enables clients to make future
adoption decisions on their own.
G. Recap—The Legal Productivity Problem
I started the Legal Evolution blog because I believe the legal
industry has a very serious problem of lagging legal productivity.
This problem is (a) causing ordinary citizens to forgo access to legal
advice; (b) fraying relationships between corporate clients and
outside counsel; and (c) causing a collapse in demand for law school
graduates.137  From a social welfare perspective, this is a very preca-
rious position.
Solving the legal productivity problem is going to require the
uptake of new innovations.  If you want to be an effective change
agent, perhaps in support of your own innovation, you would bene-
fit from learning the basic principles of diffusion theory and de-
ploying them in an analytically rigorous way.
The next and final section discusses Crossing the Chasm and
Hype Cycle, which are topics highly relevant to law in the year
2018.
VIII. “CROSSING THE CHASM” AND THE “HYPE CYCLE”
FIGURE 19 HYPE CYCLE FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, 2017
137. See supra Section I.
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FIGURE 20 THE REVISED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE
The two figures above reflect frameworks that are widely used
within the technology industry to grapple with the treacherous na-
ture of high-tech product development.
Figure 19 is the 2017 Hype Cycle, which is published by Gart-
ner, a large international research company that helps chief infor-
mation officers (CIOs) and other IT professionals understand and
evaluate emerging technologies.  The Hype Cycle has been pub-
lished every year since 1995, always with the same shape and the
same five stages, beginning with the “innovation trigger” and end-
ing with the “plateau of productivity.”  The only changes are the
technologies and their relative placement on the Hype Cycle.
At the “peak of inflated expectations” for 2017, we see several
types of artificial intelligence that are now widely discussed in the
legal press, often with headlines that foreshadow the replacement
of lawyers by machines.  According to Figure 19 and Gartner’s 2017
Hype Cycle, such a threat is premature, overblown, or both.
The second figure (Figure 20) looks like a Rogers Diffusion
Curve, but with a large gap between the early adopter and early
majority segments.  The gap is the “chasm” discussed in Geoffrey
Moore’s Silicon Valley classic, Crossing the Chasm.138  Figure 20 is
titled “The Revised Technology Adoption Life Cycle” because
Moore added a gap in order to reflect the crucial transition from
early adopters to the early majority.  (Prior to Moore’s book, the
high-tech community relied heavily upon the unrevised model—i.e.,
a model identical to the Rogers Diffusion Curve.)
Moore’s core thesis is that most high-tech ventures fall into this
chasm between early adopters and early majority. These ventures
die because they fail to grasp the many moving parts that must be
138. See MOORE, supra note 18.
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fashioned and coordinated to move from the early market to the
mainstream market—i.e., to cross the chasm.  Moore’s book pro-
vides very detailed prescriptive advice about how to cross this
chasm.  Once on the other side of the chasm, a company has a much
higher probability of ascending the upward-bound S-curve and thus
producing a large financial return for company founders and
investors.
Moore’s book is essentially a practitioner’s manual, far re-
moved from academic theory or empirical validation.  Yet, it is now
in its third edition and has sold more than 300,000 copies.139
This section of the article, which is entitled, “Crossing the
Chasm” and the “Hype Cycle” examines topics that are not part of
diffusion theory, at least not directly.  Nonetheless, these two
frameworks have long guided decision-making in the tech industry;
and tech is indisputably where the legal industry is headed.  There-
fore, those working in legal innovation need to understand what
these concepts mean and how these two concepts fit into diffusion
theory.  This final section is divided into three parts:
• Part I summarizes the key features of Geoffrey Moore’s
widely used and powerful chasm framework.  It is very impor-
tant for readers to understand these ideas from the perspec-
tive of Moore and his audience—i.e., as practical business
advice being dispensed to entrepreneurs.  Surely practicing
lawyers ought to be sympathetic to this approach.
• Part II applies Moore’s framework to a real-world example of
high-tech companies selling to legal departments.  Part II then
finishes the chasm framework and explains the special chal-
lenges of applying it to the legal industry.
• Part III reveals the unusual intellectual origins of Crossing the
Chasm and how those origins illustrate several of the key con-
cepts of diffusion theory in ways that are surprising and
ironic.  Part III also returns to the Gartner’s Hype Cycle as a
lens for viewing technologies at the industry rather than the
company level.
More so than the prior sections, this section speaks to the spe-
cific challenges of legal start-ups and technology companies.  Law
firms are discussed, albeit primarily as part of a “distribution chan-
nel” that controls valuable client relationships.  For a variety of rea-
sons, most law firms will be reluctant partners.  It is unclear
whether in the long run that will prove to be a wise strategy.
139. See Crossing the Chasm, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-
ing_the_Chasm (last visited on Nov. 2, 2017).
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A. Part I.  The “Crossing the Chasm” Framework
An entrepreneur “crosses the chasm” by turning a fledging
start-up into a high-growth business built around a new technology.
Much to the chagrin of technology inventors, the technology itself is
not sufficient to reach this goal.  Instead the technology must be-
come part of a “whole product solution” that anticipates and over-
comes a wide range of potential obstacles to adoption.
Building a whole product is less a technical feat than an ex-
tended exercise in commercial empathy.  Several market competi-
tors may have similar technology.  But according to Moore, the first
to build and communicate a whole product solution will be the first
to cross the chasm and capture the mainstream market.140
Below in Figure 21 are two graphics that reflect different as-
pects of the whole product solution.
FIGURE 21
Figure 21A is what Moore refers to as the Whole Product
Model.  It shows four products:  the generic product; the expected
product; the augmented product; and the potential product.  At the
center is the Generic Product, which is “what is shipped in the box
and what is covered by the purchasing contract.”141  However, end
users make buying decisions based on the “expected product,”
which Moore describes as “the minimum configuration of products
and services necessary to have any chance of achieving the buying
objective.”142  For example, if the generic product is an IBM PC
equipped with a Microsoft DOS operating system—a product on
140. See MOORE, supra note 18, at 114 (“[W]inning the whole product battle
means winning the war.”).
141. Id. at 111.
142. Id.
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the market when Moore was writing the first edition of Crossing the
Chasm—Figure 21B is a reasonable depiction of the ancillary prod-
ucts and services that make up the expected product.
A company has crossed the chasm when it has become a mar-
ket leader in a niche portion of the mainstream market.  Although
the foothold is not large, it is the ideal place to develop the “aug-
mented” and “potential” products (the third and fourth rings in Fig-
ure 21A).  If the expected product was the IBM PC shown in Figure
21B, the augmented product might include a customer hotline, ad-
vanced training, accessible service centers, and expanded software
offerings.  Likewise, the potential product might include what we
see today—a platform for streaming entertainment and playing
complex, interactive games.
1. The Early Market versus the Mainstream Market
According to Moore, its not the underlying technology that
separates winners and losers.  Rather, it is a failure of both entre-
preneurs and investors to realize that the market is divided into two
parts—an early market, where a promising generic product is suffi-
cient; and a mainstream market, where customers will not buy with-
out overwhelming evidence that they are, in fact, buying the whole
product.  This division is depicted in Figure 22.
FIGURE 22
Success in the early market comes in the form of major sales to
visionary clients who see the technology’s breakthrough potential.
This market evidence is often sufficient for venture capitalists to
provide another round of financing in anticipation of rapid growth.
This is because VCs—more so in the days before Moore’s book—
bought into the smooth continuous shape of the Technology Adop-
tion Life Cycle (Figure 22 above, but without the chasm).  All too
often, however, the S-curve adoption never materializes.
The recurring mistake, according to Moore, is that customer
expectations are dramatically different in the early versus the main-
2018] INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY 463
stream market.  In the early market, “visionary” early adopter cus-
tomers are drawn to the potential breakthrough implications and
have the imaginative capacity to envision the whole product as
something real and inevitable.  Yet, visionary buyers are relatively
rare.  But Moore argues that the problem runs deeper than that—
these “visionary” early adopters are unsuitable as reference clients.
Moore refers to the early majority (the leading edge of the
mainstream) as “pragmatists” because their buying requirements
are so practical and stringent.  “When pragmatists buy, they care
about the company they are buying from, the quality of the product
they are buying, the infrastructure for supporting products and ser-
vices and systems interfaces, and the reliability of the service they
are going to get.”143  In other words, they want either the expected
product or an augmented product.  When the company’s sales team
points to visionaries, the pragmatists are unimpressed, distrusting
the visionary’s risk-taking, flaunting of convention, excessive atten-
tion given to early stage technology, and the “overall disruptive-
ness” they impose on others.144
If a tech start-up is not aware of the chasm, it runs the risk of
being lulled into complacency by a few large sales to visionary cli-
ents.  But more problematic is the resulting “catch-22.”  As Moore
notes, “[t]he only suitable reference for an early majority customer
. . . is another member of the early majority.”145  This is the problem
that Crossing the Chasm is trying to solve.
2. How Does a Company Cross the Chasm?
A company transitions from the early market to the main-
stream market—i.e., crosses the chasm—by focusing on a niche
market where, by sheer dint of preparation and focus, it becomes
“the only reasonable buying proposition.”146  The narrow focus is
necessary to conserve limited resources and increase the odds of
delivering a whole product solution.  This “big fish, small pond”
strategy enables the start-up to “secure a beachhead in a main-
stream market—that is, to create a pragmatist customer base that is
referenceable.”147
Moore provides tremendous guidance on how to find the right
niche market.  The difficulty is that a technology start-up only has a
few significant clients in the early market, none of whom are repre-
143. Id. at 43.
144. Id. at 58–59.
145. Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 110.
147. Id. at 68.
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sentative of the mainstream.  Because better information is time
and cost prohibitive, pre-chasm companies operate in a “low data,
high risk” environment.  Thus, the only option is to engage the
management team’s imaginative faculties to anticipate the needs,
preferences, and objections of the various stakeholders employed
by your target clientele.  This is the extended exercise in commer-
cial empathy mentioned earlier—and it’s extremely difficult, partic-
ularly for left-brained technical types (lawyers as well as engineers).
The next section illustrates the importance of commercial em-
pathy by applying Moore’s methodology to a contemporary legal
industry example.
B. Part II:  Applying the “Crossing the Chasm” Framework
Imagine that we are part of a legal tech start-up that has devel-
oped a machine-learning AI capability with the potential to be a
best-in-class solution for many time-consuming and important ac-
tivities inside a large legal department.  We’ve made a few sales to
some visionary legal innovators/early-adopter types, but the work
has mostly been custom.  As of yet, we don’t have a turn-key solu-
tion that is scaleable.  Further, none of us has focused on the hum-
drum details of successful implementation.  In fact, we have no
reference customers that would satisfy a pragmatist buyer.  In short,
we are a pre-chasm company.
To keep the team believing in the cause and to avoid running
out of cash, we have three short-term objectives:
1. Dramatically reduce our sales cycle
2. Limit the amount of customization (ideally to zero)
3. Obtain a base of satisfied pragmatist clients.
Following Moore’s chasm playbook from Part I, these three
objectives are only possible by overwhelming a niche market seg-
ment with our commitment to their problem set and making our
company “the only reasonable buying proposition.”148
Thus, the task on our plate is to correctly identify the right
niche market and, through intense focus, successfully deliver a
whole market solution.  Otherwise, we are going to fall into the
chasm.
148. See id. at 110.
2018] INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY 465
1. Which Market Niche?149
As noted in Part I, the only tools we have to cope with our
“low data, high risk” environment are imagination and empathy.
We start by developing composite profiles of characters work-
ing inside our typical buyer and evaluate, as objectively as possible,
how our product positively and negatively affects each of their lives.
If the buyer is a legal department, the cast of characters would
likely include the GC, the Director of Legal Operations, line in-
house counsel, paralegals and administrative staff, CEO, and CFO,
etc.
If we are like other founders and technical types, we’re likely
very self-satisfied regarding the versatility of our technology, claim-
ing it can solve many problems well.  That may be true, but what
product application is going to have the biggest impact across multi-
ple internal stakeholders?  If we can deliver a whole product solu-
tion in that specific niche, the resulting word-of-mouth buzz will
create the enormous tailwind we need to get to the other side of the
chasm.
We identify the starting point by building a matrix of stake-
holders and applications and scoring each combination on a 1 to 5
scale.  Table 2 uses Moore’s scoring system, where 1= “not usable”
and 5= “must have.”
TABLE 2
Score Impact
1 Not usable
2 Unusable, but with no obvious benefits
3 Nice to have – the end user will appreciate these benefits although they
are not strategic to the organization sponsoring the purchase
4 Should have – the end user receives strategic benefits, although these
benefits can readily be achieved by other means as well
5 Must have – the end user receives benefits that are strategic to the spon-
soring organization and cannot be achieved by any other reasonably
comparable means.
Adapted from Geoffrey Moore, Crossing the Chasm ch. 4 (1991)
What are some the applications for machine-learning AI?  Based
on what I’ve seen at CLOC, ILTA, the ACC Legal Ops meetings,
149. The exercise below is based on Chapter 4 “Target the Point of Attack” of
the first edition of Geoffrey Moore’s CROSSING THE CHASM.  The original exercise,
now more than 25 years old, used a pen-based laptop as the innovative new
technology. See id. at 101–08.
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and general networking within the industry, there are many.  Each
of the applications in Table 3 below reflect real use cases currently
being pitched to large legal departments.  In other words, the fate
of numerous pre-chasm companies hangs in the balance.  The as-
signed numbers are based on the composite sketches of how the
application would impact the daily lives of specific personnel.  Fol-
lowing Moore’s methodology, we are always looking for “must
haves.”
TABLE 3
Application Customer Stakeholders / Endusers
General Dir. of Deputy Line Paralegal CEO /
Counsel Legal Ops GC Counsel / Staff CFO
M&A Due Diligence 4 4 4 5 5 3
Outside Counsel Selection 4 5 2 2 1 4
Legacy Contract Scoring 4 4 3 3 3 4
Compliance Monitoring 4 3 2 2 2 5
Automated Legal Review 4 4 4 4 4 3
Adapted from Geoffrey Moore, Crossing the Chasm ch. 4 (1991)
Note that the scores inevitably vary based on the stories we con-
struct, albeit we want to construct the most balanced and plausible
story possible.  Indeed, the entire point of this exercise is to prime
the right side of our brains so we can see the world through the eyes
of prospective customer stakeholders and end users and accurately
identify who would most benefit from our product.  Once identi-
fied, we’ll do everything in our power to adapt it into something
they must have.
For example, regarding the first application, M&A due dili-
gence, a corporate acquisition can be a heavy burden on in-house
corporate counsel and paralegals.  Thus, they might welcome the
automation of a large volume of boring scut work.  Yet, how much
internal juice do they have to influence decision-making?  If, how-
ever, the company is a serial acquirer where the typical targets in-
volve complex IP or environmental issues that warrant the
extensive use of outside counsel, then the score assigned to the GC,
Director of Legal Ops, or the CEO/CFO might reach a five, partic-
ularly if the whole product solution reveals a large quality advan-
tage (i.e., the machine makes fewer mistakes than people; the
machine aids corporate integration).  This has become Kira Sys-
tems’s value proposition.150
150. To learn more about Kira Systems, Inc., see website at https://kirasys-
tems.com/.
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Note how the search for “must haves” in the example above
has the effect of narrowing the niche market—to serial acquirers
with due diligence that is voluminous and legally complex.
The second AI application, outside counsel selection, can also
be narrowed.  For example, if legal is a significant cost in a thin-
margin business (e.g., insurance, retail, transportation), the GC and
CEO/CFO scores might reach the must-have level.  This might
compensate for the fact that lawyers and staffers who regularly
work with outside counsel aren’t going to like the disruption of
changing firms.
Likewise, for the fifth AI application, automated legal review,
there are products entering the market that score the legal risks of a
proposed contract against desired terms in the company’s playbook,
essentially doing the reading and analyzing normally done by law-
yers.  In most legal departments, this will score a three or four, as it
adds no strategic value and the AI machine might make a mistake
that will make decisionmakers look bad.  Yet, in complex industries
where in-house staff is already at 100 percent capacity, automated
first-level legal review of low-risk, high-volume contracts may be a
better long-term solution than more FTEs.  Thus, this might be-
come a “must have” for a GC or Director of Legal Ops who needs
more lawyer bandwidth focused on high-value company legal work.
I know this because Cisco’s legal department is experimenting with
this technology in conjunction with Kim Technologies.151
The above exercise can be uncomfortable for those of us in the
technical crowd who helped build the generic product.  We wonder,
“why can’t they see what we see?”  Thus, reflexively, we tout data
and the technical features of our product, often repeating ourselves.
Yet, if we can endure the discomfort of getting inside the head of
people very different than us, we’d see how our offering is often a
mixed bag when second-order and third-order effects are factored
in.152
To boil it down, if this exercise is faithfully performed, we dra-
matically increase our odds of locating a niche mainstream market
where a specific application of our product is a must have.  But all
too often, the temptation is to double-down on sales.  “We don’t
have time for theories.  We don’t have time for books.”153
151. To learn more about Kim Technologies, see website at http://ask.kim/.
152. Cf. supra Section VII (reporting “client orientation” and “client empa-
thy” as key attributes of effective change agents).
153. See MOORE, supra note 18, at 68 (“The consequences of being a sales-
driven during the chasm are, to put it simply, fatal.”).
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2. How to Position (i.e., Describe) our Product
Buyers have different agendas than sellers, particularly in the
mainstream market.  As Moore notes, the lead buyers in the main-
stream are pragmatists who want to make a safe choice that will
enable them to look good and hit their numbers.  Pragmatists also
have other things on their plate besides making a purchasing deci-
sion.  Thus, to save time and avoid mistakes, they’re going to cate-
gorize our product based upon their current frame of reference.
According to Moore, this will be done by placing us within a
competitive bracket based upon other vendors and products.  Such
categorization takes mental work.  If we leave all of this work to the
pragmatist, the comparisons will be too simplistic and unfavorable
to us.  Thus, as much as possible, we should pre-package a compari-
son to aid our prospective customers.
Moore calls this “positioning” and offers the following plug-
and-play formula to make sure we get it right.  Moore instructs the
reader to “just fill in the blanks”:
• For (target customer)
• Who (statement of need or opportunity)
• The (product name) is a (product category)
• That (statement of key benefit–that is, compelling reason to
buy)
• Unlike (primary competitive alternative)
• Our product (statement of primary differentiation)154
How useful is this?  Moore offers the following example of
Microsoft’s positioning of Windows 3.0 in the early 1990s:
For IBM PC users who want the advantages of a Macintosh-style
graphical user interface, Microsoft Windows 3.0 is an industry-
standard operating environment that provides the ease of use
and consistency of a Mac on a PC-compatible platform.  Unlike
other attempts to implement this type of interface, Windows 3.0
is now or will very shortly be supported by every major PC appli-
cation software package.155
In a profoundly concise format, this positioning statement
gives the pragmatist everything he or she needs to make a purchas-
ing decision.
By proper positioning, we boil everything down so we can pass
what Moore calls “the elevator test.”  Specifically, if our product
can’t be easily described in the time it takes to travel from floor to
154. Id. at 160–61.
155. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
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floor in an elevator, then our product will never get the enormous
tailwind of a word-of-mouth campaign within the mainstream mar-
ket.156  Until we get this distillation right, we’re stuck with an im-
possibly long sales cycle and the likelihood that our competitors will
do our positioning for us.
3. What our Customers Say about Us
When crossing the chasm, there is (a) the positioning statement
we communicate to our target customers before the sale, and (b)
what our customers say about us after they’ve experienced our
product.  The subtitle of Moore’s book may lull lawyers into believ-
ing that Moore is only talking about (a) how to position the prod-
uct.  Yet, Moore seems no less worried about (b).  Moore writes:
In the simplified [whole product] model there are only two cate-
gories:  (1) what we ship and (2) whatever else the customers
need in order to achieve the compelling reason to buy.  The latter
is the marketing promise made to win the sale.  The contract does
not require the company to deliver on this promise—but the cus-
tomer relationship does.  Failure to meet this promise in any bus-
iness-to-business market has extremely serious consequences.  As
the bulk of the purchases in this marketplace are highly refer-
ence-oriented, such failure can only create negative word-of-
mouth, causing sales productivity to drop dramatically.157
A careful reading of Moore reveals that the “big fish, small pond”
strategy is as much about conserving bandwidth and resources by
not overpromising as it is about finding a market segment with a
must-have customer need.
Ironically, as difficult as it is to enter the mainstream market—
have a great generic product, pick the right market niche, position
the product so it’s easy to buy, and then deliver on the whole prod-
uct solution—the rules seem to operate in reverse once a company
gets to the other side of the chasm.  Moore notes, “the more you
spend time with mainstream customers, the more you see how re-
lentlessly they pursue this conspiracy to sustain market leaders.”158
Thus, crossing the chasm is a one-time event that permanently al-
ters the financial fortunes of a company—a game that is very much
worth the effort.
156. See id. at 159 (“Since we have already established that word of mouth is
fundamental to success in high-tech marketing, you must lose [if you can’t pass the
elevator test].”).
157. Id. at 115.
158. Id. at 75.
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4. Selling and Law Firms as Distribution Channels
Returning to our AI-enabled legaltech start-up, what’s our sales
plan?
Most of the context of Crossing the Chasm is based on enter-
prise-level technology solutions sold to large corporate clients—
that is, the same posture as most legaltech start-ups.  Moore lists
out several options for making sales along a spectrum of “demand
creators” (a direct sales force using consultative sales) to “demand
fulfillers” (retail outlets).  The more novel and innovative our prod-
uct, the more we’ll need a direct salesforce to prime the pump.
The problem is that direct sales is expensive.  Moore notes,
“[t]o support a single consultative salesperson requires a revenue
stream of anywhere from $500,000 to several million dollars (in
1991 dollars), depending upon presales and postsales support pro-
vided.”159  As good as a direct sales team can be at educating pro-
spective customers and creating demand, Moore argues that a
direct sales force is probably not viable unless the minimum sales is
at least $50,000—again, in 1991 dollars.
As a more cost-effective alternative, Moore suggests a “selling
partnership” with another company that already has a business re-
lationship with the target clientele.  Here, law firms come to mind,
either as a bundled offering with the firm’s consultative legal ser-
vices or as a preferred vendor when the firm cannot get the work
without adding an external capability that the client is demanding.
Under this approach, law firms could become an invaluable distri-
bution channel.  Although Moore acknowledges that this approach
may dramatically cut into pricing power—“he who owns the cus-
tomer owns the profit margin and the future of the product”—he
nonetheless endorses it as a way to reduce risk and avoid the grief
of managing a salesforce not fit for purpose.160
For many legaltech and NewLaw start-ups, this approach
sounds good in theory but has seldom worked well in practice.  Per-
haps the reason can be found in the must-have value proposition
that mainstream pragmatist buyers find most irresistible.  Accord-
ing to Moore, this is a product offering that “radically improves
productivity on an already well-understood critical success fac-
tor.”161  No disruption; just a quantum improvement in what we al-
ready know.  Unfortunately, so often the business opportunity of
159. Id. at 173.
160. See id. at 175.
161. Id. at 103.
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legaltech and NewLaw is reducing the inefficiencies and quality
constraints of the traditional practice of law billed by the hour.
I know several start-up founders who wish they could get back
the thousands of hours invested in trying to strike a deal with law
firms.  Whether it’s short term self-interest or the consensus deci-
sion-making of law firm partnerships,162 law firms have yet to see
the benefits of being a distribution channel for new products or ser-
vices that could significantly help their clients.  Unfortunately, this
is a major bottleneck to innovation diffusion within the legal
industry.
C. Part III.  The Origins of Chasm Framework and back to the
Hype Cycle
Do academics and practitioners believe they have much to
learn from each other?  If we look for evidence of meaningful ex-
change—shared conferences, the prevalence of journals that appeal
to both groups, or just the quantity and quality of listening that oc-
curs when both are in the same room—the answer appears to be
“not much.”  Why is that?
Part of the reason likely turns on status.  The academy and
practice have different reward systems, with little reserved for
plowing the middle ground.  Yet, what happens when two groups of
smart people working on the same problem set effectively tune
each other out, not necessarily out of disrespect, but just so they can
finish what they perceive as their real work?
Part III offers some insight into this question by exploring the
origins of Geoffrey Moore’s chasm framework.
1. Origins of Crossing the Chasm
During the 1980s, Geoffrey Moore was a partner at Regis
McKenna, Inc., a Silicon Valley marketing firm.  In the 15 years
prior to Moore’s arrival, the firm’s legendary founder, Regis McK-
enna, had provided counsel to an extraordinary roster of technol-
ogy start-ups that went on to become industry giants (e.g., Apple,
Compaq, Intel, Lotus, Microsoft, National Semiconductor, Silicon
Graphics, and 3COM).163
According to the account given by Moore in Crossing the
Chasm, the dominant business framework relied upon by the
Silicon Valley start-up crowd was the Technology Adoption Life
162. See supra Section IV.
163. See Regis McKenna, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Re-
gis_McKenna (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
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Cycle.  Although there’s no reason to doubt Moore when it comes
to Silicon Valley terminology, the Technology Adoption Life Cycle
is, in fact, the Rogers Diffusion Curve.  Original copies of both
curves are placed side by side in Figure 23.
FIGURE 23
Although Everett Rogers is not cited anywhere in the first edi-
tion of Crossing the Chasm (or in the third edition published in
2013), Moore apparently had some vague knowledge of the model’s
origins.  In the first chapter, Moore writes, “[p]eople are usually
amused to learn that the original research that gave rise to this
model was done on the adoption of new strains of seed potatoes
among American farmers.”164  (The underlying research involved
mostly corn farmers.)165  Moore continues, “[d]espite these agrarian
root . . . the model has thoroughly transplanted itself into the soil of
Silicon Valley.”166
Ironically, the core thesis of Moore’s book is that the Technol-
ogy Adoption Life Cycle model (aka the Rogers Diffusion Curve)
contains a serious flaw.  Moore writes, “[t]he basic flaw in the
[Technology Adoption Life Cycle] model . . . is that it implies a
smooth and continuous progression across segments over the life of
a product, where experience teaches us the opposite.”167  Hence,
Moore’s insertion of the chasm to create the “The Revised Technol-
ogy Adoption Life Cycle” model.  See Figure 24 below.
164. MOORE, supra note 18, at 11.
165. See Everett M. Rogers, Categorizing the Adopters of Agricultural Prac-
tices, 23 RURAL SOC. 346 (1958) (discussing research based on corn farming
practices).
166. MOORE, supra note 18, at 11.
167. Id. at 56.
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FIGURE 24
In making this change, Moore was not the slightest bit bur-
dened by the decades of empirical research that backed up the orig-
inal model.  We know this to be true from the acknowledgements at
the beginning of the first edition of Crossing the Chasm.  Moore,
who has a PhD in English Literature, writes:
Prior to the world of high-tech, I was an English professor.  One
of the things I learned during this more scholarly period of my
life was the importance of evidence and the necessity to docu-
ment its sources.  It chagrins me to have to say, therefore, that
there are no documents or summary of evidence anywhere in the
book that follows.  Although I routinely cite numerous examples,
I have no studies to back them up, no corroborating witnesses,
nothing.168
If Moore has no awareness of the original source material, how
was Rogers’s work transmitted to Silicon Valley?  In fact, the most
likely route is a textbook example of Rogers’s own theory in action.
In 1975, Everett Rogers joined the faculty of Stanford Univer-
sity, where he stayed for approximately a decade.  During this time,
Rogers became interested in how the distinctive high-tech culture
shaped the region’s business and academic norms.  Thus, Silicon
Valley got incorporated into Rogers’s research.169
168. Id. at xv.
169. See, e.g., EVERETT M. ROGERS & JUDITH K. LARSEN, SILICON VALLEY
FEVER: THE GROWTH OF THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CULTURE (1984); EVERETT M.
ROGERS, THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY OF SILICON VALLEY (1985).
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What seems likely is that the basics of diffusion theory, includ-
ing the diffusion curve, were shared with some of Rogers’s research
subjects and other professional acquaintances.  In turn, some—
likely the innovators and early adopters—applied Rogers’s ideas to
the problems of high-tech marketing.  Because the diffusion curve
proved to be quite useful, it was shared throughout Silicon Valley’s
“social system” as the Technology Adoption Life Cycle, a title that
fit its purpose.
Several years later, Moore, reflecting upon his experience and
desiring to communicate a strategy that (a) his clients could under-
stand, and (b) would cause them to avoid financial ruin, came upon
the chasm as a better description of his clients’ core dilemma.  Iron-
ically, this adaption of Rogers’s own ideas is what diffusion re-
searchers call “re-invention.”170
Eventually Moore’s re-invention came to Rogers’s attention.
In the fifth edition of Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers writes:
The five adopter categories . . . are ideal types, concepts based on
observations of reality that are designed to make comparisons
possible. . . . Pronounced breaks in the innovativeness continuum
do not occur between each of the five categories, although some
scholars claimed that a discontinuity exists between the innova-
tors and early adopters versus the early majority, late majority,
and laggards (Moore, 1991).  Past research shows no support for
this claim of a “chasm” between certain adopter categories.  On
the contrary, innovativeness, if measured properly, is a continu-
ous variable and there are no sharp breaks or discontinuities be-
tween adjacent adopter categories[.]171
As an academic, I understand that the chasm is not supported
by data.  Yet, as someone who spent several years in a data analyt-
ics start-up company, I know there is a second question worth ask-
ing:  is there benefit in having the team believe there is a chasm so,
in an effort to avoid it, we adopt a laser-like focus on end users very
different from us?  Based on my professional experience, I would
answer the question with an emphatic yes.
2. Theory and Practice
As I describe the origins of the Technology Adoption Life Cy-
cle and the chasm framework, I hope it is obvious that I am not
170. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 180 (defining re-invention as “the degree to
which an innovation is changed or modified by a user in the process of its adoption
or implementation”).
171. Id. at 282.
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passing judgment on Geoffrey Moore or his Silicon Valley peers.  In
fact, the opposite is true.
Crossing the Chasm is a best selling business book because it
addresses an important problem—generating sufficient sales before
start-up funds are exhausted—in a lucid, non-technical way that is
loaded with industry context.  It is noteworthy that solving impor-
tant problems in a simple, culturally compatible way is the precise
advice that flows from Rogers’s empirical work.172  In fact, the gui-
dance provided by Crossing the Chasm is remarkably consistent
with Diffusion of Innovations. This is a testament to Moore’s pow-
ers of observation and his effectiveness as a business counselor.
Yet, does Moore’s example prove that practitioners have little
to learn from academics?  Or, stated another way, do the most valu-
able lessons have to be learned in the trenches and communicated
as business lore?  I am skeptical of this claim, particularly as it ap-
plies to lawyers.  If the slow pace of innovation is now threatening
the viability of our organizations and the legal profession as a
whole, we don’t have time to sort out whose “more practical” ideas
to follow or, for that matter, whether any of them really work.  In-
stead, we need to seek out valid, reliable data.
FIGURE 25
The attenuated connection between Rogers (a university aca-
demic specializing in applied research) and Moore (a marketing
practitioner) illustrates a tension experienced by those of us “in the
field” doing either applied research or working as change agents.
Applied research is generally not esteemed by university col-
leagues, primarily because it’s viewed as problem-solving (what
practitioners do).  University professors are supposed to create
knowledge.173  Yet, among practitioners, the work of applied re-
searchers is often perceived as too academic and a distraction from
keeping a paying client happy.  As a result, the middle ground tends
to be pretty barren.
It’s a long journey from pure university research to innovations
that can be packaged and sold to demanding private sector clients
at a profit.  That journey is made longer, however, because people
172. See supra Section IV (listing high relative advantage, low complexity,
and cultural compatibility as key factors in rate of adoption).
173. See supra Section I (discussing difference between applied and pure re-
search, with pure research, or knowledge creation, favored in universities).
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in different camps are reluctant to invest the time to listen to one
another, as it takes effort to overcome communication and cultural
gaps.174  The great psychologist Amos Tversky once quipped, “[t]he
secret to doing good research is always to be a little underem-
ployed.  You waste years by not being able to waste hours.”175
Innovation is advanced when disparate social systems—like
Rogers’s and Moore’s respective professional networks—remain
connected with one another.  Although the information exchanges
will tend to be more cognitively taxing than exchanges with peers,
the resulting insights justify the effort.176  In the case of Rogers and
Moore, the contact was incidental rather than planned.  Nonethe-
less, the power of the underlying ideas was sufficiently great to
leave an indelible mark on the high-tech industry.
IX. CONCLUSION—NOTHING LEFT TO CHANCE
As a concluding observation, I’ll reinforce what I hope is an
obvious point:  in the year 2018, innovation in the legal services
market does not need to be left to chance.  There is a well-devel-
oped science of innovation diffusion.  As we struggle with the many
problems created by lagging legal productivity,177 we can use diffu-
sion theory—and Geoffrey Moore’s brilliant metaphorical con-
ceits—to accelerate the adoption of innovation.  Further, we can do
it at a lower cost and with significantly less risk.
The price of admission is investing the time to learn a seeming
academic theory.  Many of your colleagues will think this is a dumb
and impractical use of their time, albeit they don’t see the world
through the eyes of an innovator or early adopter.  As a result,
these difficult problems and opportunities fall to people like you.
I would like to end this article and the foundational work for
the Legal Evolution blog by looking at emerging technology not
from the perspective of an entrepreneur trying to turn a technology
into a successful business, but as a buyer evaluating a confusing
landscape of emerging technology and trying to sort out what is
strategic (potentially affects my company’s survival) versus opera-
tional (potentially affects my bonus).  This is what IBM used to call
174. See supra Section VII (discussing challenges of change agents).
175. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT (2016) (quoting Tversky).
176. See supra Section VII (noting that innovation travels through “weak
ties” on the social system’s periphery with innovators and early adapters serving as
connectors).
177. See, e.g., Bill Henderson, Supply of Law Graduates is Shrinking, But So
is Demand (006), LEGAL EVOLUTION (May 14, 2017), https://www.legalevolution.
org/2017/05/supply-law-graduates-shrinking-demand-006/ (discussing how lagging
legal productivity is affecting court systems and the demand for law grads).
2018] INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY 477
the FUD factor—the fear, uncertainty, and doubt that surround
high-stakes decisions on relatively new and unproven technology.178
FIGURE 26. FIVE STAGES OF GARTNER HYPE CYCLE
As discussed supra in Section VIII(A), managers and execu-
tives struggling with the FUD factor have long looked to Gartner’s
annual Hype Cycle of emerging technologies.  As shown in Figure
26 above, the Hype cycle is divided into five stages, which Gartner
describe as follows:179
1. Innovation Trigger: A potential technology breakthrough
kicks things off.  Early proof-of-concept stories and media in-
terest trigger significant publicity.  Often no usable products
exist and commercial viability is unproven.
2. Peak of Inflated Expectations:  Early publicity produces a
number of success stories—often accompanied by scores of
failures.  Some companies take action; many do not.
3. Trough of Disillusionment:  Interest wanes as experiments
and implementations fail to deliver.  Producers of the tech-
nology shake out or fail. Investments continue only if the sur-
viving providers improve their products to the satisfaction of
early adopters.
178. See Regis McKenna, Foreword to MOORE, supra note 18, at xii (explain-
ing FUD factors and its origins).
179. See Gartner Hype Cycle, GARTNER, https://www.gartner.com/technology/
research/methodologies/hype-cycle.jsp.
478 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:395
4. Slope of Enlightenment:  More instances of how the technol-
ogy can benefit the enterprise start to crystallize and become
more widely understood.  Second-and third-generation prod-
ucts appear from technology providers.  More enterprises
fund pilots; conservative companies remain cautious.
5. Plateau of Productivity:  Mainstream adoption starts to take
off.  Criteria for assessing provider viability are more clearly
defined.  The technology’s broad market applicability and
relevance are clearly paying off.
What makes the Hype Cycle so tricky for law firms is that
some of the technology coming online is not operational IT that can
be safely put off until stage five.  Rather, it’s “discontinuous innova-
tion” that has the potential to fundamentally change how legal
problems are solved—hence the growth in the number of legal
start-ups and NewLaw companies who see the opportunity.  This
suggests that there are real consequences to arriving late to the
party.  These dynamics move law firms closer to their clients in
terms of needing to continuously innovate.180  This is a sea change
that is steadily gathering force.
Lawyers, law firms, and those working in the legal services
space overlook these changes and the clients’ perspective at their
peril.  Although the challenge can be daunting, it is important for
legal services innovators to realize that they are not alone.  The Le-
gal Evolution blog is one example of ongoing efforts to create com-
munication channels in which legal services innovators, as well as
other on the diffusion curve, can communicate with one another
and share their experiences.  The goal of this article and the founda-
tional blog posts for analyzing and understanding both the suc-
cesses—and the failures—of legal services innovations and to
create an environment that increases the chances of widespread dif-
fusion of worthy innovations.
180. See, e.g., McLellan, supra note 105 (quoting legal industry expert:
“Every company is going to become a tech company in some capacity.  That ulti-
mately is going to be true of professional service firms and law firms as well.”).
